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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5925
There is a renewed debate on the role of exchange rate 
policies as an industrial policy tool in both academic 
and policy circles. Policy practitioners usually examine 
real exchange rate misalignments to monitor the 
behavior of this key relative price and, if possible, 
exploit distortions in the traded and non-traded relative 
price to promote growth. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that some countries have pursued very active exchange 
rate policies to promote the export sector and enhance 
growth by undervaluing their currencies. The main goal 
of this paper is to provide a systematic characterization 
of real exchange rate undervaluations. The long-run real 
exchange rate equation is estimated using: (a) Johansen 
time series cointegration estimates, and (b) pooled mean 
group estimates for non-stationary panel data. The paper 
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constructs a dataset of real undervaluation episodes. 
It first evaluates whether (and if so, to what extent) 
economic policies can be used to either cause or sustain 
real undervaluations. In this context the paper empirically 
models the likelihood and magnitude of sustaining real 
exchange rate undervaluations by examining their link 
to policy instruments (such as exchange rate regimes and 
capital controls, among other policies) using probit and 
Tobit models. Finally, it investigates whether foreign 
exchange intervention can generate persistent real 
exchange rate deviations from equilibrium. In general, 
it finds that intervention can lead to greater persistence 
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1. Introduction 
The  growing  globalization  of  financial  markets  –as  observed  by  rising  cross-
border trade of assets– has led to some important changes in the patterns of saving 
and  investment  across  the  world.  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2007,  2008a)  have 
extensively  documented  the  fact  that  emerging  market  economies  (in  particular, 
emerging  Asia  and  oil exporting  countries)  have  become  net  suppliers  of  savings 
while the United States has become an absorber of global savings. This saving glut in 
emerging markets and the excess consumption in the U.S. led to the so-called global 
imbalances.  The  recent  debate  on  the  resolution  of  these  imbalances  has  brought 
attention towards the role of the real exchange rate (RER) as the relative price that 
would drive the international  adjustment of countries.  It  has  been argued that the 
depreciation of the US dollar may help improve the net foreign asset (NFA) position 
of the country through trade and financial effects (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005, 
2006, 2008b). The trade effect suggests that current account deficits will narrow (and, 
eventually, turn into a surplus) because of a weakening of the US dollar required. The 
financial effect, on the other hand, implies that the depreciation of the US dollar may 
lead to an improvement of the NFA position due to the fact that the US external 
liabilities are mostly denominated in US dollars whereas its external assets have a 
more  varied  currency  composition.  Therefore,  the  real  exchange  rate  exerts  an 
influence on both net capital flows and net capital gains on external holdings (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007; Galstyan and Lane, 2008).  
Emerging market economies have recently undertaken competitive devaluations 
so  as  to  keep  their  currencies  undervalued  and,  hence,  promote  exports.  Recent 
evidence  shows  that  growth  accelerations  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher 
investment, export surges and real exchange rate depreciation (Hausmann, Pritchett 
and Rodrik, 2005). Rodrik (2008) finds a somewhat positive co-movement between 
RER  undervaluation  and  growth  increases  in  China;  India;  South  Korea;  Taiwan, 
China; Uganda; and Tanzania. He states that undervaluation facilitates growth among 
developing countries and stresses the role of the relative price of traded to non-traded 
goods as an instrument of industrial policy in the process of economic convergence. 
Theoretically, Rodrik (2008) argues that RER undervaluation acts as a second-best 
mechanism  to  alleviate  distortions  in  developing  countries  (e.g.  institutional 
weaknesses  and  incomplete  contracts  in  the  traded  sector,  and  information  and  
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coordination  problems)  and,  hence,  foster  structural  change  and  spur  growth. 
Aizenman and Lee (2007), on the other hand, suggest that RER undervaluations may 
be used to internalize a learning-by-doing (LBD) externality in the traded sector if the 
LBD calls for subsidies to labor in tradables. This debate has led to a heated argument 
about the desirability of undervaluations and the likelihood to support them through 
economic policies.  
Official intervention on the foreign exchange market is one of the crucial issues in 
the  subject  of  academics  and  policy-related  literature.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
intervention may tend to introduce a deviation of the exchange rate relative to its long 
run  equilibrium.  An  abundant  body  of  research  has  been  conducted  on  the 
effectiveness  of  FOREX  market  intervention  in  stabilizing  exchange  rates.  For 
instance,  Taylor  (2004)  estimated  a  Markov-switching  model  to  examine  the 
effectiveness of intervention on the US$-DM exchange rate (from 1985 to 1998) and 
found that intervention increased the likelihood of stability when the real exchange 
rate  is  misaligned,  and  that  this  influence  grew  with  the  degree  of  misalignment. 
However, intervention can also generate greater instability. According to Sarno and 
Taylor  (2001)  overall,  the  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of  official  intervention, 
through either the portfolio balance channel or the signaling channel, is still mixed on 
balance,  although  the  more  recent  literature  does  suggest  a  significant  effect  of 
official intervention on both the level and the change of exchange rates. 
Doroodian and Caporale (2001) support the view of Friedman and Schwartz that 
exchange rate intervention destabilizes the foreign exchange market by introducing 
additional level of uncertainty. They test the effectiveness and the impact of Federal 
Reserve intervention on US dollar against German mark and Japanese yen of daily 
data from January 3, 1985 to March 19, 1997. Their results from GARCH suggest that 
the  intervention  causes  significant  increase  in  the  conditional  variance  of  spot 
exchange rates.  
Why is this study of real exchange rate misalignments so relevant? Real exchange 
rate  misalignments  help  to  signal  distortions  in  relative  prices.  Measuring  the 
misaligned  currencies  (in  real  terms)  would  permit  us  to  assess  and  monitor  the 
behavior  or  real  exchange  rate  as  well  as  examine  the  consequences  of  either 
overvaluation or undervaluation of the currency in real terms. It has been documented 
in the literature that a real overvaluation of the currency may have an adverse impact 
on economic performance –especially, if this is associated with poor macroeconomic  
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and inconsistent exchange rate policies (Dollar, 1992; Razin and Collins, 1999). A 
relatively  stronger  currency  tends  to  raise  the  cost  of  imports  (among  them, 
intermediate inputs and capital goods) and has a detrimental effect on investment. 
Moreover the loss of competitiveness associated with the overvaluation could hamper 
the country’s ability to adjust internationally and reallocate resources more efficiently 
across  the  different  sectors  of  economic  activity.  However,  the  literature  on  the 
growth  effects  of  RER  undervaluation  is  not  abundant.  As  we  mentioned  above, 
Hausmann et al. (2005) and Rodrik (2008) have suggested that RER undervaluation 
may trigger growth.
1 If it is true that real undervaluation of the currency leads to 
higher growth, the relevant policy question is what type of policy shocks may cause 
RER undervaluations and how persistent these are.  
To accomplish this task, we  use RER misalignments based on Kubota (2009) . 
This  measure  of  RER  misalignments  is  as  deviations  of  the  actual  from  the 
equilibrium RER. We estimate the fundamental RER equation using  the following 
econometric techniques:  (a) Johansen  time series  cointegration  methods,  and  (b) 
pooled mean group (PMG) for non -stationary panel data.
2 This equilibrium level is 
derived from a theoretical model that guarantees intertemporal BOP equilibrium and 
equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable goods market by solving for the current 
account dynamics and Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) productivities. We calculate 
the RER misalignment using two different types of estimates for the coefficients of 
the long-run RER equation: the time series estimates (Johansen, 1998, 1991) and the 
PMG panel estimates.  
The main goal of our paper is to test whether economic policies and regulations 
undertaken by the authorities affect the likelihood of keeping the RER undervalued 
and/or determine the size of the undervaluation. This will allow us to test whether the 
―mercantilist‖ view of the exchange rate policy is empirically valid. To accomplish 
this task we gather  an unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries, of which 21 are 
                                                 
1 Recent research on the ―mercantilist‖ view of exchange rate policy suggests that the accumulation of 
international reserves by some countries such as China and Argentina are aimed at keeping the real 
exchange rate undervalued; therefore, promote growth through rising exports (Rodrik, 2008). Others 
suggest that accumulating reserves may soften the blow of adverse financial and real shocks –that is, 
demand for reserve hoarding is precautionary (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Cheung et al. 2007). 
2In order to compute our theory-based measure of RER misalignment a long-run RER equation from a 
theoretical model that considers the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) as the relative price of 
tradable to non-tradable goods. The building blocks of the model will follow Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964) for equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable goods market, and Mussa (1984) 
and Frenkel and Mussa (1985) for the inter-temporal BOP equilibrium.  
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industrial economies and 58 are developing countries, over the period 1971-2005 (i.e. 
at most 36 observations per country).  
This paper uses limited dependent variable techniques to explore: (a) the linkages 
between policy actions and the likelihood of sustaining undervaluations, and (b) the 
ability of economic policy to influence the magnitude of real undervaluations. As a 
result, we evaluate whether real exchange rate undervaluations could be sustained by 
economic  policy  actions  using  Probit  and  Tobit  analysis.  While  the  probabilistic 
model (Probit) helps to estimate to what extent the likelihood of achieving a real 
undervaluation  of  the  currency  is  affected  by  policies,  the  Tobit  model  examines 
whether  the  size  of  undervaluations  can  be  influenced  by  policies  such  as  active 
intervention  in  the  exchange  market  by  the  Central  Bank  (say,  reserve  hoarding), 
capital  controls,  labor  and  output  market  regulations,  among  other  factors.  We 
proceed to test whether other policies can generate a more persistent likelihood of 
exchange rate deviations, and then we also test whether ―de facto‖ fixed or flexible 
exchange rate arrangements allow a faster speed of mean reversion. 
 
We  first  undertake  our  Probit  and  Tobit  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  the 
incidence and magnitude of undervaluations. In short, our Probit analysis shows that 
pro-active economic policies may have an effect on the likelihood of sustaining the 
RER undervaluation while our Tobit model shows that the authorities may have a 
more limited ability to influence the magnitude of the RER undervaluation.  
Our  Probit  analysis  shows  evidence  that  active  exchange  rate  policies  may 
influence the incidence of RER undervaluations —as measured by deviations from 
equilibrium RER calculated using both the Johansen estimated coefficients and the 
PMG ones. For instance, with Johansen estimated RER misalignments, intervention in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  is  effective  to  support  small  to  medium  RER 
undervaluation  and  its  effect  becomes  non-negligible  for  larger  degrees  of 
undervaluation. The flexibility of exchange rate arrangements —proxied by either the 
coarse or fine classification of arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)— 
has a positive and significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of undervaluation. 
These findings imply that countries with more flexible exchange rate arrangements 
and  larger  intervention  in  the  FOREX  market  are  able  to  experience  episodes  of 
currency undervaluation. Analogous to the intervention result, an active fiscal policy 
seems to raise the likelihood of small to medium RER undervaluation, and it becomes  
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ineffective when the RER undervaluation is larger (say, more than 20 percent). For 
RER  misalignments  calculated  using  our  PMG  estimates  of  the  long-run  RER 
equation, trade openness becomes positive and significant while liability dollarization 
is negative and significant. These results may imply that: (a) countries that are more 
open  to  trade  may  be  more  successful  in  engineering  an  undervaluation,  (b)  the 
likelihood of undervaluation is smaller in countries that are highly dollarized. The 
latter result may reflect the ―fear of floating‖ due to deleterious effects of depreciation 
on the balance-sheet of countries with high liability dollarization. Finally, it should be 
pointed  out  that  the  measure  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  robustly  positive  and 
significant, whereas intervention in the FOREX market has a significant effect on the 
incidence of undervaluation only in the presence of fiscal discipline. 
The  Tobit  analysis  shows  that  policymakers  may  have  a  more  limited  role  in 
influencing the magnitude of the RER undervaluation with either Johansen or PMG 
estimated  RER  misalignments.  In  contrast  to  our  Probit  results  with  Johansen 
estimated RER misalignments, flexible exchange arrangements and FOREX market 
intervention  have  a  less  robust  link  with  the  size  of  RER  undervaluations.  The 
exchange  arrangement  is  mostly  not  significant  in  all  regressions,  while  FOREX 
intervention has a positive and significant effect only while controlling for the fiscal 
policy  stance.  With  the  PMG  coefficient  estimates  of  the  long-run  RER  equation 
capital account openness variables (as measured by the ratio of foreign liabilities to 
GDP, TL, and foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, TAL) are positive and significant 
while the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness is significant in regressions that do 
not control for fiscal discipline. Moreover, fiscal discipline and liability dollarization 
have  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient  while  trade  openness  is  positive  and 
significant. Intervention is significant only when controlling for fiscal discipline while 
exchange rate regime has a robustly positive and significant coefficient estimate. 
Next,  we  investigate  whether  foreign  exchange  intervention  can  generate 
persistent  RER  deviations  from  equilibrium.  Our  Probit  analysis  shows  that  RER 
misalignments may not be easily corrected (hence, deviations may persist) in highly 
dollarized  economies  and  will  dissipate  at  a  slower  speed  in  countries  with  less 
flexible  arrangements.  More  specifically,  the  speed  of  mean  reversion  would  be 
slower  in  countries  with  fixed  regimes  in  RER  overvaluation.  In  turn,  FOREX 
intervention will also reduce the speed of mean reversion and, therefore, generate a 
more persistent incidence of undervaluation.    
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While  looking  at  whether  intervention  in  FOREX  markets  can  generate  more 
persistent  deviations  in  terms  of  magnitude,  our  Tobit  analysis  fails  to  show 
significant  results.  This  paper  finds  that  FOREX  intervention  may  affect  the 
persistence  of  the  likelihood  of  undervaluation  rather  than  the  magnitude  itself. 
Overall  the  coefficient  estimates  from  Tobit  estimates  are  relatively  negligible 
compared with Probit results.  
 
This paper consists of the following sections: Section 2 explains the data used in 
the  empirical  work.  Section  3  describes  the  econometric  methodology  applied  to 
evaluate  the  determinants  of  the  incidence  and  size  of  real  exchange  rate 
misalignments (Probit and Tobit analysis, respectively) whereas Section 4 analyzes 
the results from our Probit and Tobit analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  The Data 
This section provides the description and sources of the data used in our empirical 
analysis. We follow Kubota (2009)
 3 to define and generate the data on real exchange 
rate misalignment, and RER misalignments are defined as deviations of the actual 
RER  from  its  equilibrium  level.  First,  we  describe  the  data  sources  on  the 
determinants of the real exchange rate as suggested by the model in Kubota (2009). 
Then we gather annual information for a sample of 79 countries over the period 1971-
2005 and for a wide array of factors such as exchange rate regimes, capital controls, 
foreign exchange intervention, trade and financial openness, liability dollarization and 
central government balance. Finally, we calculate the RER misalignment using two 
different types of estimates for the coefficients of the long-run RER equation: (a) 
Johansen  time  series  cointegration  estimates,  and  (b)  PMG  estimates  for  non-
stationary panel data. 
 
2.1. The Determinants of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 
In order to define the dependent variable in the analysis of the likelihood and 
sustainability of RER undervaluations, we first need to define the real exchange rate 
misalignment  as  the  deviation  of  the  actual  RER  from  its  equilibrium  value. 
Following Kubota (2009) we compute the equilibrium RER by first regressing the 
                                                 
3This working paper is based on the author’s Ph.D. thesis.  
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actual RER on the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, productivity differentials and 
terms of trade. The actual RER is proxied by the real effective exchange rate (REER), 
as defined by the domestic price index of country i vis-à-vis the price index of its 

































       
 
where eit is the nominal exchange rate of country i (vis-à-vis the US dollar) in period 
t, Pit is the consumer price index of country i in period t, dkt is the nominal exchange 
rate of the k-th trading partner of country k in period t (in units of local currency vis-à-
vis the US dollar), and 
0
kt P  is the wholesale price index of the k-th trading partners in 
period t. The nominal exchange rate, e, is proxied by the average price of the dollar in 
local currency (line rf of the International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)). Domestic and foreign prices, P, are proxied by the consumer price 
index of the country (line 64 of IFS). According to this definition, an increase in q 
implies a real appreciation of the domestic currency.  
NFA  data  is  drawn  from  Lane  and  Milesi-Ferretti  (2001,  2007).  This  database 
comprises a set of foreign asset and liability stocks for a large group of industrial and 
developing countries spanning over the 1970-2005 period. The construction of the 
data is thoroughly documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), and the NFA 
position of country i in year t is defined as: 
 
      it it it it it it it it LL LA RA EQYL EQYA FDIL FDIA NFA         
 
where the letters  A and L denote assets and liabilities, respectively. Thus, the net 
foreign asset position is the sum of net holdings of direct foreign investment, FDIA-
FDIL, plus net holdings of portfolio equity assets, EQYA-EQYL, and the net position 
in non-equity related assets (i.e. ''loan assets''). In turn, the net position in non-equity 
related assets consists of international reserves, RA, and the net loan position, LA-LL.  
For productivity differentials we use labor productivity differentials weighted by 
trade patterns. Then, we develop the data on labor productivity of traded and non- 
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traded sectors based on ISIC code classifications of the economic activity.
4 Output per 
capita is proxied by GDP per capita, and output per capita of the foreign country is a 
trade-weighted average of GDP per capita of the domestic country's tradin g partners. 
TOT is the ratio of export to import prices. Data are taken from IMF, the World Bank, 
OECD, and national central banks. 
The equilibrium RER is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients of the 
long-run RER equation by the permanent values of the RER fundamentals. These 
permanent  components  are  computed  using  the  band-pass  filter,  and  the  RER 
misalignment is the difference between the actual and equilibrium levels of the RER
5. 
According to our definition of RER, positive (negative) deviat ions imply a real 
exchange  rate  over -  (under-)  valuation.  We  use  two  different  set  of  estimated 
coefficients  to  compute  the  RER  misalignment.  While  we  compute  RER 
misalignments using the Johansen time series cointegration estimator, for the sake of 
robustness we also compute the RER misalignments using the PMG estimator for 
non-stationary panel data series. 
 
2.2  The  Determinants  of  the  Likelihood  and  Sustainability  of  Real  Exchange 
Rate Undervaluations  
After defining the real exchange rate misalignments, we examine the ability of 
economic policies to affect the probability and magnitude of RER undervaluations. 
We include policy variables such as exchange rate regimes, capital controls, foreign 
exchange  market  intervention,  trade  openness,  liability  dollarization  and  fiscal 
discipline.  
Exchange Rate Regimes. We approximate the exchange rate regime de facto in 
place in the country by the database developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
updated by Ilzetzky, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). These authors have developed a 
new  system  to  classify  historical  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  contrast  to  previous 
                                                 
4 The sign of the coefficient of relative labor productivity at Home (relative to the Foreign) country will 
be positive (negative) if the surge in aggregate labor productivity is explain by shocks to tradables 
(non-tradables).  
5 The coefficient estimate of the ratio of net foreign assets (NFA) to GDP may be subject to issues of 
reverse causality as it can be argued that the NFA position of the country is sensitive to valuation 
effects arising from changes in the real exchange rate. In spite of the detrending the NFA position 
(using band-pass filtering techniques), this permament component of NFA is still determined by the 
exchange rate. For instance, a real depreciation will increase the absolute value of the stock of net 
foreign debt assets over GDP. Therefore, net debtors would see their NFA worsening with a 
depreciation, which captures the correlation implicit in the model but for the wrong reasons.  
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classifications,  their  extensive  database  is  not  only  uses  of  market-determined  or 
parallel  exchange  rates  but  also  develops  a  natural  classification  algorithm. 
Specifically,  we  use  the  fine  classification  of  Reinhart-Rogoff  that  takes  values 
between 1 and 15 where higher values indicate a higher level of flexibility in the 
exchange rate arrangements in place. 
The data on capital controls used in this paper is a binary variable collected from 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. It 
takes the value of 1 in the years when restrictions on capital account transactions are 
in place and 0 otherwise (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003). The typical problem 
of this type of data is that, although it captures the presence of controls, it fails to 
capture the intensity of the controls imposed.  
As a result, countries with closed capital account may increase the stringency of 
those  controls  by  imposing  restrictions  on  current  account  transactions,  multiple 
exchange rate practices or the surrender of export proceeds while countries with an 
open  capital  account  may  still  restrict  the  flow  of  capital  by  imposing  other 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2007). To capture 
these aspects, we complement the measure mentioned above with the inverse of the 
Chinn-Ito  index  of  financial  openness  which  incorporates  the  different  types  of 
restrictions  on  cross-border  financial  transactions  stated  above.  We  multiply  the 
Chinn-Ito index by -1 to capture the presence of different types of restrictions on 
cross-border  financial  transactions.  Higher  values  of  this  new  index  would  imply 
more strict restrictions on cross-border financial operations. 
The data on intervention in the foreign exchange market is constructed following 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007). We aim to show whether FOREX intervention 
has  a  lasting  effect  on  the  real  exchange  rate.  Although  it  has  traditionally  been 
argued that nominal interventions are unlikely to have a real impact, we examine 
whether  FOREX  interventions  help  to  sustain  misalignments.  According  to  Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) we construct a measure of intervention that is not 
affected by the growth-induced increases in money demand —which in turn may lead 
to either increases in domestic credit or in international reserves. To calculate such a 
measure, we construct first the ratio of reserves to broad money (M2) for country c in 
year y and month m, R2c,y,m,  









, , 2             
 
and, then, intervention in the FOREX market, Int2, is computed as the average of the 
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Note that  Int2  is  positive  whenever  reserve  accumulation  exceeds  the  increase  in 
monetary aggregates —thus, implying a strong degree of intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.  
We  also  consider  trade  and  financial  openness  as  determinants  of  RER 
misalignments. Trade openness is proxied as the ratio of real value of exports and 
imports (that is, total trade) to real GDP, and the data is obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Measuring financial openness involves 
data on foreign assets and liabilities from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007). We 
construct the ratio of foreign liabilities as a percentage of GDP (which include stocks 
of  liabilities  in  portfolio  equity,  foreign  direct  investment,  debt  and  financial 
derivatives) and, for robustness purposes, the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to 
GDP.  We also assess the role played by the composition of capital flows in affecting 
the ability of the government to sustain RER undervaluations. Hence, we decompose 
our measure of  financial  openness  into equity-  and loan-related foreign liabilities. 
While the former includes the foreign liability position in foreign direct investment 
and portfolio equity, the latter includes only the debt liability position (i.e. portfolio 
debt and other investments). The same calculation is performed for the ratio of foreign 
assets and liabilities to GDP.  
Liability dollarization is measured as the ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial 
sector to money. The data is taken from the IFS —more specifically, lines 26C and 34 
for foreign liabilities of the financial sector and broad money, respectively. Although 
this is not a direct measure of the extent to which a country’s balance sheet present 
currency  mismatches  in  assets  and  liabilities,  there  is  a  wide  availability  across 
countries and over time which is attractive for panel data analysis. For robustness  
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purposes, a measure of financial dollarization
6 from Levy-Yeyati (2006) is also used, 
namely the ratio of deposit dollarization. 
Our proxy for fiscal discipline is the central government balance as percentage of 
GDP and the data is obtained from WDI and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO). Savings is measured as the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP in local 
currency units taken from WDI whereas private consumption is the ratio of household 
final consumption expenditures to GDP in local currency units from WDI. Finally, 
export growth is annual percentage growth rate of exports of goods  and services, 
gross domestic investment is calculated as the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP 
in  local  currency  units,  and  inflation  is  the  percentage  change  in  consumer  price 
index. All the variables mentioned above are constructed using data from WDI. 
 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
This  section  describes the econometric techniques  we  use to  examine whether 
policymakers  are  able  to  sustain  real  exchange  rate  misalignments  –and,  more 
specifically,  undervaluations,  through  policy  actions.  As  a  result,  we  empirically 
model the likelihood of sustaining a RER undervaluation as well as the magnitude of 
this  undervaluation  using  limited  dependent  variable  and  censored  variable 
techniques. In particular, we examine the impact of active economic policies on the 
likelihood  (or  incidence)  of  real  exchange  rate  undervaluations  using  the  Probit 
analysis while the Tobit analysis is used to assess the effects of economic policy on 
the size or magnitude of RER undervaluations. 
 
3.1. The Probit Model 
The Probit model is a model of binary choice where the dependent variable takes 
the value of one whenever there is a sharp real undervaluation of the currency and 
zero otherwise. Suppose that X is a binary variable that can only take two possible 
outcomes, zero (0) and one (1). We also have a vector z of variables that is assumed to 
have an effect on the outcome X. Hence, we assume that our probabilistic model 
(Probit) takes the following form: 
     , 1 Pr z F X ob            
                                                 
6 Dollarization data by Levy-Yeyati (2006) does not have enough coverage. Therefore, we use this data 
only for robustness purposes.    
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     , 1 0 Pr z F X ob             
 
Our regression model is such that: 
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The dependent variable takes the value of 1 whenever the actual RER depreciates 
more than equilibrium (or appreciates less than equilibrium) beyond a threshold, and 
0 otherwise. We test whether policy variables have an influence on the likelihood of 
achieving  an  undervalued  real  exchange  rate.  The  negative  coefficient  in  the 
dependent variable shows the smaller a lag in the misalignment values the higher 
tendency to undervalue the RER. Our dependent variable X is a dichotomic variable 
which reflects whether or not we observe a certain phenomenon. 
 
  1 Pr  X ob , if   0
*    k q q        
  0 Pr  X ob , otherwise          
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This means that X reflects the incidence/likelihood of episodes, where the RER is 
below, is equilibrium level beyond a certain threshold k. The response, as we see, is 
binary which is a choice among two possible outcomes is. We model this response as 
a linear regression problem and the probability of achieving an undervalued RER 
beyond some threshold k such as 5, 10, 20 and 25 percent. We regress the binary 
outcome  on  potential  explanatory  variables  such  as  intervention,  exchange  rate 
arrangements,  openness,  monetary  and  fiscal  variables.  The  expected  value  of 
achieving undervaluation in the model (given a set of explanatory variables z) is: 
 
       
   
  z X ob
k q q ob
Otherwise ob k q q ob z x E
| 1 Pr
Pr * 1





   
   
= linear function of z           
 
Our  Probit  analysis  therefore  evaluates  the  impact  of  active  macroeconomic 
policies on the  probabilities  of RER  undervaluation with  using our event-analysis 
database.   
 
3.2. The Tobit Model 
The Tobit model is a type of censored regression model where the latent variable 
cannot always be observed while the explanatory variables are always observed. The 
Tobit model has the following general specification: 
 
i i i z x    
 '             
0  i x  if  0 

i x            
  i i x x  if  0 

i x            
 
The latent variable,   

i x E  is  i z
'  . The estimation of this model is similar to one of 
truncated regression. The log-likelihood for the censored regression model is: 
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In our model the dependent variable is the extent of RER undervaluation when it takes 
place otherwise 0 when the RER is in equilibrium or overvalued. 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  absolute  value  of  the  undervaluation  beyond  a 
certain threshold, and 0 otherwise. We test whether policy variables have an influence 
on the extent of real undervaluation of the local currency. The negative coefficient in 
the dependent variable means that the smaller a lag in the misalignment the larger 
magnitude  of  undervaluation  in  the  local  currency.  This  model  is  used  when  the 
response is continuous but possibly censored with the dependent variables assuming 
discrete values. Although these values are unknown, we can still identify whether 
those values are greater than some threshold values. We want to investigate whether 
the  RER  undervaluations  greater  than  some  thresholds  such  as  5,  10,  20  and  25 
percent. Hence, our dependent variable is as: 
 
| |
* q q X    if   0
*    k q q          
0  X , otherwise            
 
This implies that  X  reflects  the  magnitude  of  the  deviation  of  RER  below  its 
equilibrium  level  beyond  a  certain  threshold  k.  We  measure  the  size  of  the 
undervaluation  when  it  is  greater  than  a  threshold  k  and  explain  whether  our 
explanatory variables affect the size of the undervaluation beyond a certain threshold. 
In short, our Tobit analysis examines the effects of macroeconomic policies on the 
magnitude of RER undervaluations.  
 
4.  Empirical Assessment 
This section discusses the findings from the limited dependent variable analysis 
on  the  linkages  between  economic  policies  and  the  likelihood  (of  sustaining)  and 
magnitude of RER under-valuations. 
 
4.1. Policy Analysis of RER Undervaluations: Probit and Tobit Models  
We  examine  the  linkages  between  policy  actions,  the  likelihood  of  sustaining 
under-valuations  and  the  extent  to  which  policy  can  affect  the  magnitude  of  the 
undervaluation —these  relationships are evaluated using Probit and Tobit models, 
respectively. Some researchers argue that some countries (e.g. China and Argentina)  
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use active exchange rate policies to undervalue their currency in real terms so that 
they can foster growth in their economic activity. Our purpose is to test whether it is 
likely that economic authorities can sustain under-valuations and whether they could 
affect the size of this undervaluation through the use of active exchange rate policies 
(say, strong intervention in the foreign exchange market by the monetary authority), 
and the use of capital controls, strategies of outward orientation and fiscal discipline 
among other factors.  
 
4.2. What Determines the Success in Occurring Undervaluations? 
In  the  following  section  we  discuss  the  results  on  the  effects  of  policy 
determinants  on  the  likelihood  of  occurring  real  exchange  rate  undervaluations 
beyond  some  determined  threshold,  and  the  influence  of  the  authorities  on  the 
magnitude of the real exchange rate undervaluation. 
The incidence of RER undervaluation, I(q-q ), is captured by a dummy variable 
that  takes  the  value  of  one  when  the  RER  deviation  from  its  computed  long-run 













       
 
where we define the occurrence of RER undervaluation for different values of the 
threshold  —more specifically,  = 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%.  
Also, we define the variable magnitude of undervaluation, S, is captured by a 
dummy variable that the value of one when the RER deviation from its computed 
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4.2.1 Can Pro-Active Policies Determine the Likelihood of Occurring RER 
Undervaluations? A Probit Analysis 
We model the likelihood of real exchange rate under-valuations occurring using 
Probit  models  and  test  whether  pro-active  economic  policies  may  affect  its  
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probability. The set of policies comprises active exchange rate policies (as proxied by 
the  exchange  rate  regime  in  place  and  the  degree  of  integration  in  the  foreign 
exchange market), outward-oriented policies in goods and asset markets (say, trade 
and  financial  openness)  and  the  composition  of  capital  flows,  reducing  currency 
mismatches (as measured by the degree of liability dollarization), and fiscal discipline 
(as measured by the central government surplus). 
The empirical assessment explores the link between economic policies and country 
characteristics on RER undervaluation. Our purpose is to show whether governments 
can sustain the real undervaluation of the currency through policy actions. Therefore, 




Table 2 shows the baseline regression analysis for our Probit model where the 
dependent  variable  takes  the  value  of  1  whenever  there  is  an  episode  of  RER 
undervaluation beyond 5%. In this table, the RER misalignment was calculated using 
the time series estimates of the long-run RER coefficients. The lagged misalignment 
(as calculated with the Johansen estimates) is statistically significant in our Probit 
regressions. Therefore, misalignments tend to correct themselves, which is sensible 
due to our definition of misalignments as not only the reflection of policy but also of 
real  shocks  to  which  the  economy  ultimately  adapts.  Hence,  real  exchange  rate 
misalignments  in  period  t-1  would  affect  the  likelihood  of  undervaluation  in  the 
current  period  (t), thus  enabling the  initial  RER  misalignment  to play a role. For 
instance, the negative coefficient of the lagged misalignment found in regression [1] 
in Table 2 shows that a drastic devaluation likely occurs with a probability of 27.3% 
that might lead to an undervalued local currency in real terms if there is an initial 
disequilibrium. Regarding financial openness, it is found that foreign liabilities (FL) 
and  total  foreign  assets  and  liabilities  (FAL)  are  all  insignificant.  The  lack  of 
significance of the outcome measures of financial openness may be attributed to the 
fact that we do not take into account the composition of capital flows.
7  The policy 
measure of financial closedness  —as  measured  by  a  measure  of  capital  controls 
derived from the Chinn-Ito index— enters with a significant coefficient but the sign is 
                                                 
7 We analyze whether the composition of capital flows matters in Table 4.   
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not robust. Closed capital accounts have a negative sign when we control for fiscal 
policy and a positive one when we do not control for that variable. If we include fiscal 
policy in our regression, trade openness reduces the likelihood of undervaluation by 
about 9.5 percent, while excluding fiscal policy raises the effect of openness by 8.3 
percent. 
Fiscal discipline, as measured by the Central Government budget balance (as % of 
GDP) enters with an expected negative sign. This implies that countries with healthier 
fiscal positions are less likely to undervalue their currencies.  
Interestingly, the exchange rate regime (as proxied by the fine classification of 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) and intervention in the foreign exchange market enter 
with a positive sign in our regressions. This implies that countries with more flexible 
exchange rate arrangements and more frequent intervention in the FOREX market are 
able  to  generate  an  undervaluation  of  the  currency.  Liability  dollarization  is  only 
significant  without  fiscal  policy;  hence,  dollarization  matters  on  a  probability  to 
undervalue the exchange rate while central government does not process its policy.   
Table 3 shows our baseline Probit regressions with RER misalignments calculated 
using our PMG estimates of the long-run RER equation. The lagged misalignment is 
statistically  significant;  hence,  real  exchange  rate  misalignments  in  the  previous 
period  would  affect  the  likelihood  of  undervaluation  in  the  current  period.  The 
negative significant coefficients imply that the initial RER misalignment plays a role. 
FA and FAL are significant in most cases. Compared with our results in Table 2, trade 
openness becomes positive and significant while liability dollarization is negative and 
significant. These results may imply that: (a) countries that are more open to trade 
may  be  more  successful  in  engineering  an  undervaluation,  (b)  the  likelihood  of 
undervaluation is smaller in countries that are highly dollarized. The latter result may 
reflect the ―fear of floating‖ due to deleterious effects of depreciation on the balance-
sheet of countries with high liability dollarization. Finally, it should be pointed out 
that  the  measure  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  robustly  positive  and  significant, 
whereas intervention in the FOREX market has a significant effect on the incidence of 
undervaluation only in the presence of fiscal discipline. 
 
Composition Effects in Financial Openness 
Table 4, on the other hand, presents the  results  for the  composition  effects  of 
financial openness. That is, we test whether the structure of external liabilities plays a  
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role in determining the likelihood of real undervaluations. Before we discuss these 
results we should point out that our policy measure of financial openness (the index of 
capital  controls)  enters  the  regressions  with  an  insignificant  coefficient.  As  we 
mentioned above, we conjecture that the failure to  find a significant  impact  from 
outcome measures of financial openness such as the total foreign assets and liabilities 
may be due to fact that different types of capital flows may have opposite effects on 
the likelihood of occurring RER undervaluations. For instance, Calderón and Kubota 
(2009) show that the composition of capital flows is important when analyzing the 
factors that help mitigate the impact of shocks on real exchange rate volatility. In fact, 
they found that shocks to the RER would be mitigated by the accumulation of equity-
related foreign liabilities, whereas they would be amplified by loan-related foreign 
liabilities. 
This distinction between different types of flows and integration to capital markets 
may be important due to the different persistence of these flows and its differential 
impact on RER and its deviations from equilibrium. Hence, we decompose foreign 
liabilities into equity- and loan-related liabilities. Note that the coefficient of equity-
related liabilities is robustly negative across specifications while that of loan-related 
liabilities  is  positive  and  significant.  This  shows  that  the  structure  of  external 
liabilities  plays  a  role  in  explaining  the  probability  of  real  exchange  rate 
undervaluations taking place.  
Finally, we should point out the following interesting results in Table 4 (when 
controlling  for  the  structure  of  external  liabilities):  countries  with  more  flexible 
exchange  rate  arrangements  (proxied  either  by  the  coarse  or  fine  classification  of 
exchange rate regimes) are more prone to generate an undervaluation of the currency. 
So do countries that intervene in foreign exchange markets. 
Table  5  presents  our  results  for  the  incidence  of  undervaluation  and  RER 
misalignments are calculated using the pooled mean group estimator. It shows that 
loan-related liabilities have a negative and significant coefficient while equity-related 
liabilities are neither negative nor significant.  On the other hand, undervaluations are 
more  likely  to  occur  in  countries  with  high  trade  openness  and  lower  liability 
dollarization.  Although  fiscal  discipline  does  not  have  a  significant  effect,  our 
indicator of exchange rate flexibility has a positive and significant coefficient that is 
robust  to  its  different  definitions  or  classifications.  Finally,  intervention  is  again 
positive and significant if we control for the presence of fiscal discipline.  
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Real Vulnerabilities 
Tables 6 and 7 test  whether vulnerabilities on the real side might prevent the 
country  from  sustaining  undervaluation  Real  vulnerabilities  are  measured  by  the 
degree of: (a) output concentration —as measured by the Herfindahl index of sector 
value added based on the one-digit ISIC code of economic activity, and (b) export 
concentration as approximated by the Herfindahl index of export values using the 
COMTRADE database. In addition, to test whether the effect of openness depend 
upon the diversification of economic activity in the country, we interacted our trade 
openness ratio with both measures of concentration. The results reported in Table 6 
show that we fail to find a significant effect from trade openness and concentration. 
These  results  suggest  that  the  trade  patterns  of  specialization  do  not  matter  in 
determining the probability of RER undervaluation. Table 7 reports our results for 
RER undervaluations constructed from PMG estimates of our RER equation. This 
table shows robustly a positive and significant effect of trade openness and a negative 
and significant effect for liability dollarization. However, we should point out that 
countries  with  either  output  or  export  concentration  fail  to  have  any  significant 
differing impact on the likelihood of undervaluations.  The flexibility of exchange rate 
regimes  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  while  either  intervention  or  fiscal 
discipline is not significant. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Tables  8  through  13  replicates  the  results  reported  in  Tables  2  through  7  for 
different thresholds of RER undervaluation. In the first two columns of these Tables 
we report the baseline results for a RER undervaluation greater than 5%. Then, we 
present  the  results  where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  occurrence  of  a  RER 
undervaluation  taking  place  as  defined  by  higher  thresholds  –say,  10,  20  and  25 
percent. 
With RER misalignments measured using our Johansen estimates we find that (as 
opposed to the results found with undervaluations beyond 5%) capital controls have a 
positive and significant effect for undervaluations greater than 10, 20 or 25%. This 
implies  that  capital  controls  may  be  successfully  used  to  sustain  larger 
undervaluations. Since higher values indicate high intensity of capital controls, the 
positive coefficient estimate implies that capital controls may help to maintain the real 
exchange rate undervalued —say, by either avoiding further appreciation that what  
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the equilibrium appreciation dictates or by leading to further depreciation (beyond the 
equilibrium  level).  Table  9  reports  our  results  for  RER  undervaluations  estimated 
using  our  panel  data  PMG  estimator  and  shows  that  capital  controls  may  have  a 
significant effect for a larger value of the undervaluation threshold. That is, capital 
controls may influence the incidence of larger undervaluations.  
For our Johansen time-series estimates of undervaluation, trade openness variable 
(open) fails to yield a significant coefficient estimate and so do the outcome measures 
of financial policy while trade openness is positive and significant especially with a 
lower threshold with  RER  misalignments  using PMG. Fiscal  discipline with RER 
misalignments by Johansen, on the other hand, shows a negative and significant sign 
only when we consider thresholds of undervaluation of 5 and 10%. This implies that 
fiscal discipline reduces the likelihood of being able to sustain undervaluations. If the 
threshold is 20 or 25 percent, the fiscal variable becomes insignificant. This shows 
that fiscal policy is effective while the probability of the RER undervaluation is still 
closer  to  its  equilibrium  and  fiscal  policy  likely  becomes  ineffective  while  the 
threshold gets more than 20 percent. Liability dollarization with RER misalignments 
by PMG shows negative and significant especially with a lower threshold although we 
did not find any significance in fiscal discipline.   
Finally, the ability to sustain undervaluations granted by flexible exchange rate 
regimes and FOREX market intervention is robust for different thresholds of RER 
undervaluation with RER misalignments by Johansen (see Table 8). Higher values of 
the indicator of intervention in the foreign exchange market (Int2) help signal a more 
active policy to keep the currency undervalued. The regressions in Tables 8 through 
13 shows that with the 5 percent threshold the RER is more likely to undervalue in 
countries pursuing a more active intervention in the foreign exchange rate market. As 
the value of the threshold increases, the coefficients become insignificant. This means 
that  the  RER  is  less  likely  to  be  undervalued  when  pursuing  a  more  active 
intervention  when  the  RER  gets  too  far  from  its  equilibrium.  With  RER 
misalignments by PMG exchange rate regimes are robust but the results of FOREX 
market intervention varies.  
Table 10 and 11 investigate the effects of the structural of external liabilities on 
the  likelihood  of  generating  and/or  sustaining  RER  undervaluations  using  our 
Johansen and PMG estimates, respectively. Our findings in Table 10 are consistent 
with those of Table 4: equity-related liabilities enter with a negative sign whereas  
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loan-related liabilities have a positive coefficient. Countries with a large accumulation 
of loan-related liabilities are more prone to sustain RER undervaluations. Table 11 
supports  the  evidence  of  the  composition  effect  but  at  a  larger  threshold  of 
undervaluation. 
Central  government  balance as  a fiscal  variable is  a positive significant  if the 
threshold  is  either  5  or  10  percent  in  Table  8~12  when  RER  misalignments  are 
computed using Johansen. While using PMG, on the other hand, we fail to find a 
significant coefficient estimate for our proxy of fiscal discipline. Table 12 and 13 
include the real vulnerabilities –as proxied by concentration in economic activity and 
in the export sector. Although we mostly fail to find a significant coefficient for those 
variables, we find a positive significant coefficients in output concentration with the 
incidence of RER undervaluations when misalignments are computed using PMG. 
 
Dollarization Robustness Analysis 
Table  14  replicates  the  results  from  the  baseline  regressions  using  different 
measures of dollarization: (a) the ratio of foreign liabilities to money used in Cavallo 
and  Frankel  (2008),  and  (b)  the  ratio  of  deposit  dollarization  from  Levy-Yeyati 
(2006). As a benchmark for this variable, we also include some regressions without 
dollarization. We present the results for lower to higher thresholds (10, 20 and 25 
percent). Table 14 depicts these results. 
Our control variables in the regression show pattern seen so far. The coefficient of 
lagged  RER  misalignment  as  calculated  from  the  Johansen  estimates  is  always 
statistically negative significant in Table 14. While the coefficient of the Chinn-Ito 
index of de jure financial openness is always positive significant, that of total foreign 
liabilities  is  always  positive  significant  without  dollarization  measure.  Exchange 
regime  is  positive  and  significant  in  almost  all  regressions  while  intervention  is 
positive and significant with the ratio of foreign liabilities and without dollarization 
when the threshold is 5 percent.  
Regarding  our  variable  of  interest  in  Table  14,  dollarization,  we  find  that  the 
coefficient estimate is positive and significant for both measures when the proxy of 
fiscal discipline is not included in the regression.  
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Can  other  policies  generate  a  more  persistent  likelihood  of  exchange  rate 
deviations?  
Table  15  reports  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  for  dollarization.  This 
implies  that  misalignments  may  not  be  easily  corrected  in  highly  dollarized 
economies due to fear of floating (and the associated deleterious effects on economic 
activity of balance sheet effects of depreciations). As a result, we  proceed to test 
whether ―de facto‖ fixed or flexible exchange rate arrangements allow a faster speed 
of mean reversion. Table 16 reports the regression results of our baseline regression 
with the interaction term between lagged RER misalignments and fine classification 
of exchange rate regimes by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The negative and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term imply that countries with less flexible exchange 
rate arrangements tend to have a slower speed of reversion in the RERs. That implies 
that the misalignments will dissipate at a slower speed in countries with less flexible 
arrangements. 
Table  17  shows  the  baseline  regression  results  augmented  by  two  interaction 
terms: the lagged interaction between overvaluation and exchange rate regime and the 
lagged  interaction  of  undervaluation  and  exchange  rate  regime.  The  coefficients 
estimates show that the interaction term for undervaluation and exchange rate regime 
is negative and significant. Hence, the speed of mean reversion is slower for countries 
with fixed regimes and especially so in situations of RER overvaluation. As a result, 
intervention when these deviations are present generates a more persistent incidence 
of undervaluation. We should point out that for countries with fixed  regimes; the 
speed of mean reversion is slower when the misalignment is an overvaluation rather 
than an undervaluation.  
 
Intervention Analysis 
Our results so far show that intervention in the FOREX market has a statistically 
(and  economically)  significant  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  an  undervaluation.  In 
addition, we test here whether that intervention may be able to generate a persistent 
deviation in exchange rates. To accomplish this task, we include an interaction term 
between  the  RER  misalignment  and  the  intervention  in  the  FOREX  market.  The 
rationale  behind  this  analysis  is  that  intervention  may  reduce  the  speed  of  mean 
reversion of the exchange rate and thus make the deviation from equilibrium more 
persistent (hence, we expect a positive coefficient). Table 15 shows the results of the  
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baseline regression augmented by the interaction term. All regressions reported show 
that  the  interaction  term  is  positive  and  significant.  Therefore,  foreign  exchange 
intervention may slow down the speed of mean reversion. This means that deviation 
from equilibrium (in this case undervaluation) would be more persistence, and the 
slowdown will be greater is the extent of intervention in FOREX market is larger. In 
addition, the coefficient of intervention itself (alone and not interacted) is positive and 
significant in the lower thresholds. 
Finally,  we  create  the  interaction  term  which  multiplies  intervention  by 
overvaluation and intervention by undervaluation. Table 18 shows that the interaction 
coefficients  are  all  positive  and  significant  in  most  cases.  This  implies  that 
overvaluation and undervaluation generate more persistent deviations. However, the 
effect  for  the  undervaluation  is  economically  much  larger  than  the  one  for  the 
overvaluation.  
 
4.2.2 Can Active Policies Affect the Magnitude RER Undervaluations? A 
Tobit Analysis 
We  model  the  likelihood  (or  incidence)  of  real  exchange  rate  undervaluation 
episodes  using  Probit  models  and  test  whether  pro-active  economic  policies  may 
affect that probability. We assume that the set of policies that may exert an influence 
on the incidence of undervaluation episodes includes active exchange rate policies 
(typically,  identified  as  more  flexible  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  substantial 
intervention in the foreign exchange market), outward-oriented policies in goods and 
asset markets (say, trade and financial openness) and the composition of capital flows, 
declining currency mismatches (as measured by the degree of liability dollarization), 
and fiscal discipline (as measured by the central government surplus). 
We empirically explore the link between economic policies and the incidence (or 
likelihood) of RER undervaluation episodes controlling for country characteristics. 
Our purpose is to show whether governments can engineer real undervaluations of the 
currency (i.e. real depreciation beyond that attributed to fundamentals) through policy 
actions. Therefore, we evaluate the impact of economic policies on the probability of 
a RER undervaluation taking place. 
Our  limited  dependent  variable  analysis  is  carried  out  using  the  measure  of 
undervaluation that is derived from the deviation of the actual RER from the time-
series cointegration estimate of the equilibrium RER. We use these estimates rather  
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than the PMG estimates for the following reasons: first, it deals with the issue of 
heterogeneity of the long-run parameters across countries in our real exchange rate 
equation. Second, even if the Hausman tests of the PMGE fail to reject the null of 
homogeneity, this result could be driven by very large standard deviations in some 
countries.  We  should  also  point  out  that  although  the  measures  of  misalignment 
calculated using the time series and panel date cointegration techniques may go in the 
same direction (indeed, they are positively correlated –especially, among industrial 
countries), there may be some large quantitative differences. These differences may 
be attributed to the fact that, in fact, the regression may be a better fit for average 
countries rather than countries that deviate from this average. 
 
Baseline Results 
Tables 19 through 24 present our Tobit analysis of RER undervaluations. The 
dependent  variable  measures  the  size  of  the  undervaluation  (in  absolute  value) 
whenever the actual rate weakens relative to the equilibrium real exchange rate by 
more than 5%. The baseline results in Table 19 (with RER misalignments calculated 
using  the  time-series  Johansen  cointegration  estimates)  show  a  negative  and 
significant coefficient for the lagged level of RER misalignment. This implies that the 
degree  of  RER  misalignment  in  the  previous  period  would  affect  the  extent  of 
undervaluation in the current period. For instance, regression [1] in Table 19 implies 
that if the RER misalignment index deteriorates by 50% (ln(1/2)=-0.69) in period t-1, 
the probability of affecting the level of RER undervaluation in period t by 15% (=-
0.229 x -0.69).  
Interestingly,  either  policy  or  outcome  measures  of  financial  openness  fail  to 
explain the magnitude of RER undervaluation. An analogous result is found for trade 
openness. Liability dollarization did not seem to matter either. In contrast, the central 
government budget balance has a negative and significant coefficient. This shows that 
fiscal  policy  may  play  a  role  in  determining  the  extent  of  undervaluation  in  the 
exchange rate market. It also shows that fiscal discipline may reduce the size of the 
undervaluation. 
Finally,  the  coefficient  estimate  of  intervention  in  the  FOREX  market  is  not 
robust.  While  controlling  for  fiscal  balance  we  find  a  statistically  insignificant 
coefficient whereas it becomes positive and significant when we do not control for the  
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fiscal position. However, the exchange arrangement is not mostly  significant in all 
regressions but column [3] of Table 19. 
Table 20 uses the misalignments calculated with the PMG coefficient estimates of 
the long-run RER equation. The lagged RER misalignment again shows a negative 
and significant coefficient. Capital account openness variables such as TL and TAL 
are  positive  and  significant  while  the  Chinn-Ito  index  of  financial  openness  is 
significant in regressions that do not control for fiscal discipline. On the other hand, 
fiscal discipline and liability dollarization have a negative and significant coefficient 
when trade openness is positive and significant. Intervention is significant only while 
controlling for fiscal discipline while exchange rate regime has a robustly positive and 
significant coefficient estimate. 
 
Composition Effects in Financial Openness 
Tables 21  and 22  attempt  to  disentangle the effects  of financial openness  and 
investigates whether the structural of foreign liabilities helps determine the size of 
RER undervaluations. In Table 21 we present the findings of RER misalignments 
using  the  time  series  Johansen  estimates  whereas  Table  22  uses  those  of  PMG 
estimates. Analogously to the Probit analysis, we find that equity-related liabilities 
have negative and significant coefficient while loan-related liabilities have positive 
and significant coefficient in almost all specifications reported in Table 21. 
Again,  fiscal  policy  has  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient,  whereas 
intervention in the foreign exchange market is significant only when we exclude the 
fiscal position of our analysis. The coefficient is positive though, supporting the idea 
that  active  policies  in  the  FOREX  market  may  also  influence  the  size  of  the 
undervaluation.  Finally,  we  find  that  the  exchange  rate  regime  indicator  –either 
measured by the coarse or find classification- has a positive and significant coefficient 
estimate in most regressions. Hence, countries with more flexible arrangements are 
able to sustain and also affect the magnitude of the RER undervaluation. 
Table 22 shows that loan-related liabilities are positive and significant while the 
coefficient of equity-related liabilities is not significant for a 5% threshold in RER 
undervaluations.  Trade  openness  is  positive  and  significant  while  liability 
dollarization is negative and significant. Fiscal discipline is positive significant while 
intervention is always positive significant with or without fiscal discipline. Exchange 
rate regime is always significant under any classification.  
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Real Vulnerabilities 
  Table 23 includes measures of output and export concentration as well as their 
interactions with trade openness in our set of regressions where we computed RER 
misalignments using the time–series Johansen cointegration estimates. We only find a 
positive coefficient for the Herfindahl index of export values (our measure of export 
concentration) in regression [2] of Table 23. The other coefficients of trade openness, 
trade  and  output  structure  as  well  as  their  interactions  are  insignificant.  Output 
concentration  patterns  do  not  matter  in  influencing  the  size  of  undervaluation; 
however, export patterns might be influential on the extent of undervaluation. This 
means that the extent of undervaluation is more likely to increase in countries with 
less-diversified export structures (that is, higher concentration in exports). 
  Table  24  shows  the  results  with  RER  misalignments  by  PMG.  Loan-related 
liabilities  are  positive  and  significant  while  equity-related  liabilities  are  not 
significant.  Both  output  and  export  concentrations  show  mostly  a  positive  and 
significant coefficient while trade openness in [1] is positive and significant. Liability 
dollarization and fiscal discipline are negative and significant while intervention is 
positive  and  significant  only  with  a  presence  of  fiscal  discipline.  Exchange  rate 
regime is positive and significant.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In a similar fashion to that of the Probit analysis, we report the Tobit analysis for 
different definitions of the dependent variables. Here, we change the threshold of the 
RER undervaluation –not only we report the initial results of 5% threshold but also 
run regressions  with  higher thresholds  (such  as  10, 20 and 25%). The results  are 
reported in Tables 25 through 30. 
We  find  a  robust  negative  coefficient  for  the  (lagged  level  of  the)  RER 
misalignment. This implies that the lower the index of RER misalignments, the higher 
the level of undervaluation beyond any threshold specified in Table 25 through 30 
(say,  5,  10,  20  and  25  percent).  With  RER  misalignments  computed  using  the 
Johansen  cointegration  estimator,  capital  controls  seem  to  have  a  negligible 
relationship with the magnitude of RER undervaluations. This evidence is consistent 
with Glick and Hutchinson (2005) and IMF (2007) where capital controls do not seem 
to sustain the level of the RER or reduce its volatility.  
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Fiscal discipline —as measured by the central government (CG) budget balance as 
a ratio to GDP— has a negative and significant coefficient (see Table 25, 27 and 29). 
This  shows  that  fiscal  policy  matters  in  influencing  the  size  of  the  RER 
undervaluation.  Fiscal  surpluses  may  contribute  to  fund  active  intervention  in  the 
foreign  exchange  rate  market  and  may  allow  the  authorities  to  keep  the  RER 
undervalued. However, the coefficient of CG balance becomes not significant when 
trying to sustain larger RER undervaluations (beyond 20%) in Table 27. With RER 
misalignments  calculated  using  PMG  estimates  (see  Table  26,  28  and  30)  fiscal 
discipline is negative and significant with relatively lower threshold. 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market has a positive coefficient estimate but 
not significant in most cases –except for regression [1] of Table 29 while significance 
of intervention with RER misalignments by PMG vary (see Table 26, 28 and 30). On 
the  other  hand,  the  flexibility  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  has,  in  most  cases,  a 
positive  relationship  with  the  magnitude  of  the  RER  undervaluation  in  our  Tobit 
model. It has a positive relationship in some (but not in most) regressions. In short, 
the evidence does not allow us to conclude that pro-active exchange rate policies in 
the foreign exchange markets may help influence the degree of undervaluations. The 
results of exchange rate regime with RER misalignments by PMG are robust. 
 
Table 27 shows the differential impact on the magnitude of undervaluation of the 
equity-related and loan-related financial openness. In most cases throughout Table 27, 
accumulating  equity-related  liabilities  may  reduce  the  degree  of  undervaluation 
whereas  higher  loan-related  liabilities  would  have  the  opposite  effect.  With  RER 
misalignments using PMG estimates, the Chinn-Ito index has a significant coefficient 
with a higher threshold for undervaluation while TL and TAL are mostly significant. 
The  composition  effects  are  significant  with  a  higher  threshold  with  negative 
significant  equity-related  liabilities  and  positive  significant  loan-related  liabilities. 
Trade openness with output or/and export concentration is significant with a lower 
threshold.  Otherwise,  trade  openness  without  concentration  variables.  Liability 
dollarization has a negative and significant coefficient that is robust to the different 
specifications.  Finally,  Table  29  reports  the  output  and  export  concentration 
coefficient estimates in our Tobit model. Interestingly we find a robust positive and 
significant coefficient for export concentration regardless of the level of the threshold  
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undervaluation in our Tobit analysis. Hence, larger undervaluations are more likely to 
occur in countries with less diversified export revenues. 
 
In  conclusion,  our  limited  dependent  variable  analysis  (Probit  and  Tobit 
modeling) attempts to evaluate the ability of policy variables to influence over the 
incidence and magnitude of RER undervaluation. The Probit analysis shows that pro-
active  economic  policies  may  affect  the  probability  of  sustaining  a  RER 
undervaluation. Intervention in the foreign exchange market is effective in supporting 
small to medium RER undervaluation and its effect becomes non-negligible for larger 
degrees of undervaluation. The flexibility of exchange rate arrangements —proxied 
by either the coarse or fine classification of exchange rate arrangements made by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)— has a positive and significant coefficient regardless of 
the  threshold  of  undervaluation.  This  implies  that  countries  with  more  flexible 
exchange rate arrangements and more frequent intervention in the FOREX market are 
able to  generate an undervaluation  of the currency.  Fiscal  policy is  also  effective 
while the probability of the size of RER undervaluation is small to medium whereas it 
becomes  ineffective  when  the  RER  undervaluation  is  larger  (say,  more  than  20 
percent). 
Interestingly, our results suggest that fiscal discipline shows a negative sign which 
implies that countries with healthier fiscal positions are less likely to undervalue their 
currencies. Finally, financial openness proxied by aggregate external liabilities (FL) 
or external assets and liabilities (FAL) fails to have a significant effect. This could be 
attributed to the fact that it may be important to account for the composition effect of 
capital flows. In this context, we find a robustly negative coefficient for equity-related 
liabilities and a positive and significant coefficient for loan-related liabilities. This 
shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining the probability 
of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place: while equity-related flows tend to 
reduce the ability of countries to sustain undervaluations, loan-related flows tend to 
sustain  it.  Finally,  the  coefficient  of  liability  dollarization  is  not  robust.  Foreign 
exchange market is effective in supporting small to medium RER undervaluation and 
its effect becomes non-negligible for larger degrees of undervaluation. The flexibility 
of exchange rate arrangements —proxied by either the coarse or fine classification of 
exchange rate arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)— has a positive and 
significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of undervaluation. This implies that  
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countries  with  more  flexible  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  more  frequent 
intervention  in  the  FOREX  market  are  able  to  generate  an  undervaluation  of  the 
currency.  Fiscal  policy  is  also  effective  while  the  probability  of  the  size  of  RER 
undervaluation is small to medium whereas it becomes ineffective when the RER 
undervaluation is larger (say, more than 20 percent).  Finally, export concentration —
as  measured  by  the  Hirschman-  Herfindahl  index  of  export  revenues—  shows  a 
positive and significant  coefficient. This  means  that export pattern matters  on the 
magnitude  of  RER  undervaluation.  The  results  on  the  ability  of  exchange  rate 
flexibility to affect the magnitude of the undervaluation are mixed. 
 
Dollarization Robustness Analysis 
Table  31  replicates  the  results  from  the  baseline  Tobit  regressions  using  two 
different  measures  of  dollarization  —and  including  some  regressions  without 
dollarization similarly as the Probit analysis. The results are presented from lower to 
higher thresholds (10, 20 and 25 percent). 
Compared  to  Probit  results  most  of  results  from  Tobit  does  not  show  overall 
significance although the coefficient of lagged RER misalignment as calculated from 
the Johansen estimates is always statistically negative significant in Table 31. The 
deposit dollarization is positive significant only when fiscal discipline is absent.  
  
Can other policies generate persistent deviations?  
Table 32 reports a positive and significant coefficient for dollarization while the 
interaction term between RER misalignments and intervention is not significant. In 
sum, we find that the intervention may affect the persistence of the likelihood of 
undervaluation rather than the magnitude itself.  
Analogously to the Probit analysis, we test whether ―de facto‖ fixed or flexible 
exchange  rate  arrangements  generate  more  persistent  undervaluations  (in  terms  of 
magnitude). Table 33 reports the regression results of our baseline regression with the 
interaction  term  between  lagged  RER  misalignments  and  fine  classification  of 
exchange rate regimes by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The coefficient estimates for 
this interaction are negligible.  
Table 34 shows the results  from  the baseline regressions  with  two interaction 
terms: the lagged interaction between overvaluation and exchange rate regime and the 
lagged interaction of undervaluation  and exchange rate regime.  The coefficient of  
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RER misalignments alone fails to be statistically different from zero. However, the 
interaction term between overvaluation and ER regime and between undervaluation 
and  ER  regime  in  Tobit  is  negative  significant,  therefore,  the  magnitude  of  RER 
undervaluations are more persistent in countries with  ―de facto‖ fixed regimes.  
 
Intervention Analysis 
We test whether that intervention may be able to generate persistent deviations in 
exchange rates. Similar to the Probit analysis we include an interaction term between 
the  RER  misalignment  and  the  FOREX  intervention.  Again,  the  idea  is  that 
intervention may reduce the size of the exchange rate and thus make the size of RER 
misalignments  more persistent (hence, we expect  a positive coefficient). Table 32 
shows  that  intervention  alone  is  positive  and  significant  with  lower  threshold. 
However,  the  interaction  term  has  a  positive  coefficient  although  it  fails  to  be 
statistically significant. 
Looking for asymmetric effects in the persistence of RER undervaluations, we 
also create the interaction term which multiplies intervention by overvaluation and 
intervention by undervaluation. However, the results from Table 35 are negligible.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
Assessing real  exchange rate misalignments  provides a useful  tool to  evaluate 
macroeconomic  performance  since  misaligned  currencies  (in  real  terms)  generate 
distortions  in  relative prices  and are assumed  to have an effect  on real  economic 
activity.  One  strand  of  the  literature  has  extensively  documented  the  negative 
association between RER overvaluation and development (e.g. Dollar, 1992). Other 
recent  evidence  shows  that  RER  undervaluation  is  present  in  episodes  of  growth 
accelerations (Hausmann et al. 2005). Given the evidence on the growth effects of 
undervaluation,  the  main  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  whether  RER 
undervaluations  can  be  achieved  and  maintained  through  active  macroeconomic 
policies.  
In order to accomplish this task we use real exchange rate misalignments from a 
theoretically defined equilibrium level of the RER. The theoretical model of RER 
determination  provides  and  equilibrium  RER  by  achieving  inter-temporal  BOP 
equilibrium and equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable goods market (Kubota,  
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2009). According to this model, the main determinants of the equilibrium RER are net 
foreign assets, TOT and relative labor productivity (i.e. HBS effect). This theoretical 
model will give us the framework to conceptually measure the equilibrium RER and, 
hence, RER misalignments. After the econometric estimation of the long-run RER 
equation, we construct two types of RER misalignments: (a) those estimated using the 
Johansen time series cointegration techniques, and (b) those estimated with PMG for 
non-stationary panel data. Our main goal in this paper is to examine the relationship 
between  policy  instruments  (say,  exchange  rate  regimes,  capital  controls,  foreign 
exchange market intervention, fiscal and external policies, and among others) and the 
incidence and magnitude of RER undervaluations using Probit and Tobit modeling.  
Our limited dependent variable analysis (Probit and Tobit modeling) attempts to 
evaluate the ability of policy variables to influence over the incidence and magnitude 
of RER undervaluation. The Probit analysis shows that pro-active economic policies 
may affect the probability of sustaining a RER undervaluation regardless the measure 
of misalignment used (that is either Johansen or PMG estimated RER misalignments). 
With Johansen estimated RER misalignments, we find that intervention in the foreign 
exchange market is effective in supporting small to medium RER undervaluation and 
its effect becomes non-negligible for larger degrees of undervaluation.  The flexibility 
of exchange rate arrangements —proxied by either the coarse or fine classification of 
exchange rate arrangements made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)— has a positive and 
significant coefficient regardless of the threshold of undervaluation. This implies that 
countries  with  more  flexible  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  more  frequent 
intervention  in  the  FOREX  market  are  able  to  generate  an  undervaluation  of  the 
currency.  Fiscal  policy  is  also  effective  while  the  probability  of  the  size  of  RER 
undervaluation is small to medium whereas it becomes ineffective when the RER 
undervaluation is larger (say, more than 20 percent). Interestingly, our results suggest 
that fiscal discipline shows a negative sign which implies that countries with healthier 
fiscal  positions  are  less  likely  to  undervalue  their  currencies.  Finally,  financial 
openness  proxied  by  FL  or  FAL  fails  to  have  a  significant  effect.  This  could  be 
attributed to the fact that it may be important to account for the composition effect of 
capital flows. In this context, we find a robustly negative coefficient for equity-related 
liabilities and a positive and significant coefficient for loan-related liabilities. This 
shows that the structure of external liabilities plays a role in explaining the probability 
of real exchange rate undervaluations taking place: while equity-related flows tend to  
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reduce the ability of countries to sustain undervaluations, loan-related flows tend to 
sustain it. Finally, the coefficient of liability dollarization is not robust.  
With RER misalignments calculated using our PMG estimates of the long-run 
RER equation, the coefficient of trade openness is significantly positive while that of 
liability  dollarization  is  negative  and  significant.  These  results  implied  that  an 
undervaluation is more likely to be engineered by authorities in countries that are 
more open to trade and are not highly dollarized. The latter result may reflect the 
behavior  of  policymakers  in  preventing  depreciations  of  the  currency  in  highly 
dollarized  economies  due  to  their  harmful  effects  on  the  balance-sheet  of  the 
economy. This is what the literature calls ―fear of floating.‖ Finally, the evidence 
shows  that  the  measure  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  robustly  positive  and 
significant, whereas intervention in the FOREX market has a significant effect on the 
incidence of undervaluation only in the presence of fiscal discipline.  
The Tobit analysis, on the other hand, shows evidence that the authorities may 
have a more limited ability to influence the magnitude of the RER undervaluation 
with both Johansen and PMG estimated RER misalignments. In contrast to our Probit 
results with Johansen estimated RER misalignments, flexible exchange arrangements 
and  FOREX  market  intervention  have  a  less  robust  link  with  the  size  of  RER 
undervaluations.  The  exchange  arrangement  is  mostly  not  significant  in  all 
regressions,  while  FOREX  intervention  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  only 
when controlling for the fiscal position. Fiscal policy is again effective only in small 
to medium undervaluations (below 20%). The central government budget balance has 
a negative and significant coefficient. This shows that the fiscal policy may play a 
role in determining the extent of undervaluation in the exchange rate market. It shows 
though that fiscal discipline may reduce the size of the undervaluation. With the PMG 
coefficient estimates of the long-run RER equation capital account openness variables 
(e.g. TL and TAL) are positive and significant while the Chinn-Ito index of financial 
openness  is  significant  in  regressions  that  do  not  control  for  fiscal  discipline. 
Moreover, fiscal discipline and liability dollarization have a negative and significant 
coefficient while trade openness is positive and significant. Intervention is significant 
only when controlling for fiscal discipline while exchange rate regime has a robustly 
positive and significant coefficient estimate. 
Consistent with the Probit results, we find that both policy and outcome measures 
of financial openness fail to explain the magnitude of RER undervaluation. However,  
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we find that composition effects in financial openness may affect the magnitude of the 
RER undervaluation. More specifically, equity-related liabilities have negative and 
significant  coefficient  while  loan-related  liabilities  have  positive  and  significant 
coefficient in almost all specifications. Once more, liability dollarization did not seem 
to  matter  either.  Finally,  export  concentration  —as  measured  by  the  Hirschman-
Herfindahl index of export revenues— shows a positive and significant coefficient. 
This means that export pattern matters on the magnitude of RER undervaluation. The 
results  on  the  ability  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  to  affect  the  magnitude  of  the 
undervaluation are mixed.  
We test whether macroeconomic (and, more specifically, exchange rate) policies 
can generate a more persistent likelihood of exchange rate deviations. First, we test 
whether  interventions  can  generate  persistent  RER  deviations  and,  then,  we  test 
whether ―de facto‖ fixed or flexible exchange rate arrangements allow a faster speed 
of mean reversion. In general, we find that FOREX intervention can lead to greater 
persistence in the incidence rather than the magnitude of RER undervaluations (i.e. 
we  obtain  a  statistically  significant  effect  for  the  interaction  term  in  our  Probit 
regressions and a negligible coefficient estimate in our Tobit regressions). Hopwever, 
exchange rate regimes seem to play a role in generating persistent RER deviations. 
The Probit analysis shows that the speed of mean reversion is slower for countries 
with fixed regimes in RER overvaluation.  
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Table 1: Number of Sharp Undervaluation Episodes 
Sample of 79 countries, 1970-2005
Code Country # of Episodes Code Country # of Episodes
1 ARG Argentina 4 41 JOR Jordan 1
2 AUS Australia 2 42 JPN Japan 0
3 AUT Austria 0 43 KEN Kenya 1
4 BEL Belgium 3 44 KOR Korea, Rep. 3
5 BFA Burkina Faso 1 45 LKA Sri Lanka 4
6 BGD Bangladesh 1 46 MAR Morocco 1
7 BOL Bolivia 3 47 MDG Madagascar 1
8 BRA Brazil 2 48 MEX Mexico 5
9 BWA Botswana 0 49 MYS Malaysia 2
10 CAN Canada 2 50 NER Niger 4
11 CHE Switzerland 2 51 NGA Nigeria 1
12 CHL Chile 3 52 NIC Nicaragua 1
13 CHN China 2 53 NLD Netherlands 1
14 CIV Cote d'Ivoire 3 54 NOR Norway 1
15 COG Congo, Rep. 3 55 NZL New Zealand 3
16 COL Colombia 3 56 PAK Pakistan 1
17 CRI Costa Rica 2 57 PAN Panama 3
18 DNK Denmark 2 58 PER Peru 2
19 DOM Dominican Republic 2 59 PHL Philippines 1
20 DEU Germany 3 60 PNG Papua New Guinea 3
21 DZA Algeria 2 61 PRT Portugal 4
22 ECU Ecuador 2 62 PRY Paraguay 6
23 EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 63 SEN Senegal 2
24 ESP Spain 3 64 SGP Singapore 3
25 FIN Finland 2 65 SLV El Salvador 3
26 FRA France 1 66 SWE Sweden 3
27 GBR United Kingdom 3 67 SYR Syrian Arab Republic 3
28 GHA Ghana 3 68 TGO Togo 3
29 GRC Greece 0 69 THA Thailand 3
30 GTM Guatemala 2 70 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 3
31 HND Honduras 3 71 TUN Tunisia 4
32 HTI Haiti 5 72 TUR Turkey 1
33 IDN Indonesia 3 73 URY Uruguay 3
34 IND India 3 74 USA United States 0
35 IRL Ireland 4 75 VEN Venezuela, RB 2
36 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 76 ZAF South Africa 2
37 ISL Iceland 5 77 ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 1
38 ISR Israel 5 78 ZMB Zambia 3
39 ITA Italy 1 79 ZWE Zimbabwe 3
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Table 2
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Baseline Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%)
RER Equilibrium Estimation: Time Series Cointegration (Johansen, 1988, 1991)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.273 ** -0.242 ** -0.273 ** -0.242 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.093 ** 0.083 ** 0.095 ** 0.082 **
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.93E-03 7.25E-04 ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    6.60E-04 1.17E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.97E-03 6.90E-04 -1.66E-03 7.79E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 1.78E-04 2.87E-04 * 2.34E-04 3.31E-04 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.86E-05 ** ..    -3.88E-05 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.047 ** 0.035 ** 0.049 ** 0.037 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.079 ** 0.785 ** 1.084 ** 0.797 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.37)         (0.52)         (0.37)        
Observations 1081 1480 1081 1480
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 3
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Baseline Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%)
RER Equilibrium Estimation: Pooled Mean Group Estimator (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 -4.149 ** -4.526 ** -4.118 ** -4.516 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)         (0.22)         (0.25)         (0.22)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.018 0.026 0.032 0.031
   (one lag) (0.06)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.04)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 3.20E-03 ** 1.45E-03 ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    1.83E-03 * 8.87E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 8.76E-03 ** 5.78E-03 ** 8.82E-03 ** 5.87E-03 **
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -6.78E-04 * -5.65E-04 * -6.92E-04 * -5.87E-04 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.38E-05 ..    -3.15E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.078 ** 0.042 ** 0.079 ** 0.043 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.961 * 0.382 0.960 * 0.389
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)         (0.44)         (0.61)         (0.44)        
Observations 1077 1477 1077 1477
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
1/ It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 4
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities 
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Dependent variable: Dummy(Undervaluation > 5%)=1
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.271 ** -0.273 ** -0.235 ** -0.236 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.033 0.028 0.031 0.028
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.07E-05 6.51E-05 2.37E-03 2.57E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -8.43E-05 -6.91E-05 5.05E-05 5.75E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.73E-05 ** -3.66E-05 ** ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.046 ** ..    0.033 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)        
Coarse classification /4 ..    0.149 ** ..    0.107 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)         (0.04)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.051 ** 1.094 ** 0.840 ** 0.853 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.37)        
Observations 1081 1081 1476 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
  41 
Table 5
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities 
RER Misalignments with PMG
Dependent variable: Dummy(Undervaluation > 5%)=1
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 4.163 ** -4.120 ** -4.540 ** -4.515 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)         (0.26)         (0.22)         (0.22)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.013
   (one lag) (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 * 0.003 * 0.002 * 0.002
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 9.01E-03 ** 9.25E-03 ** 6.10E-03 ** 6.19E-03 **
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.19E-04 * -7.66E-04 * -6.18E-04 * -6.52E-04 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.43E-05 -3.45E-05 ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.078 ** ..    0.043 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)        
Coarse classification /4 ..    0.225 ** ..    0.121 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.06)         (0.04)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.952 * 1.044 * 0.379 0.402
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)         (0.62)         (0.44)         (0.44)        
Observations 1077 1077 1472 1472
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
  42 
Table 6
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Dependent variable: Dummy(Undervaluation > 5%)=1
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.266 ** -0.247 ** -0.267 ** -0.248 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.040 0.037 0.039 0.037
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.006 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 7.85E-05 3.74E-04 -6.32E-04 4.10E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration /3 0.147 ..    -0.067 ..   
as Herfindahl Index ratio (2.06)         (2.59)        
Export Concentration /4 ..    0.065 ..    0.699
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.43)         (0.76)        
Output Concentration ..    ..    3.98E-03 ..   
as openness times output concentration (0.03)        
Export Concentration ..    ..    ..    -0.010
as openness times export concentration (0.01)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.93E-05 -8.22E-05 -8.85E-05 -5.16E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.78E-05 ** -3.72E-05 ** -3.77E-05 ** -3.73E-05 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /5 0.044 ** 0.043 ** 0.044 ** 0.042 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.065 ** 1.258 ** 1.065 ** 1.273 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.58)         (0.54)         (0.58)        
Observations 1049 955 1046 952
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
4/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
5/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
6/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 7
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Dependent variable: Dummy(Undervaluation > 5%)=1
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 -4.082 ** -5.978 ** -4.061 ** -6.009 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)         (0.38)         (0.26)         (0.39)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.010 0.044 0.011 0.042
   (one lag) (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 * 0.003 * 0.004 * 0.003 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.02E-02 ** 6.11E-03 ** 1.83E-04 7.80E-03 *
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Output Concentration /3 3.150 ..    0.383 ..   
as Herfindahl Index ratio (2.33)         (3.03)        
Export Concentration /4 ..    0.395 ..    0.740
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.44)         (0.90)        
Output Concentration ..    ..    6.05E-02 ..   
as openness times output concentration (0.04)        
Export Concentration ..    ..    ..    -0.005
as openness times export concentration (0.01)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.10E-04 * -5.52E-04 * -6.99E-04 * -5.10E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.47E-05 -4.08E-06 -3.53E-05 -3.69E-06
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /5 0.077 ** 0.072 ** 0.077 ** 0.072 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.821 0.080 0.763 0.087
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)         (0.71)         (0.62)         (0.71)        
Observations 1045 951 1042 948
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.006 0.000 0.020 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
4/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
5/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
6/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 6. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
 
Table 8
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Sensitivity to Changes in Threshold of the Undervaluation Episode
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.273 ** -0.273 ** -0.260 ** -0.260 ** -0.231 ** -0.231 ** -0.216 ** -0.216 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.093 ** 0.095 ** 0.100 ** 0.101 ** 0.103 * 0.105 ** 0.116 ** 0.122 **
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.06)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 0.002 ..    0.002 ..    0.002 ..    0.003 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    6.60E-04 ..    5.55E-04 ..    6.93E-04 ..    1.24E-03
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.97E-03 -1.66E-03 -3.17E-03 -2.81E-03 -1.68E-03 -1.34E-03 -1.93E-03 -1.47E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 1.78E-04 2.34E-04 2.08E-04 2.86E-04 2.46E-04 3.09E-04 1.71E-04 2.43E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.86E-05 ** -3.88E-05 ** -3.10E-05 * -3.11E-05 * -2.34E-05 -2.31E-05 -1.98E-05 -1.93E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.047 ** 0.049 ** 0.042 ** 0.045 ** 0.051 ** 0.054 ** 0.049 ** 0.052 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.079 ** 1.084 ** 1.161 ** 1.169 ** 0.841 0.849 * 0.537 0.550
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.52)         (0.53)         (0.53)         (0.57)         (0.57)         (0.58)         (0.58)        
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 9
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Sensitivity to Changes in Threshold of the Undervaluation Episode
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 -4.149 ** -4.118 ** -3.716 ** -3.682 ** -3.167 ** -3.134 ** -2.735 ** -2.715 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)         (0.25)         (0.25)         (0.24)         (0.25)         (0.25)         (0.25)         (0.25)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.018 0.032 0.095 * 0.111 ** 0.137 ** 0.153 ** 0.133 ** 0.145 **
   (one lag) (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.07)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 3.20E-03 ** ..    0.004 ** ..    0.004 ** ..    0.003 * ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    1.83E-03 * ..    2.12E-03 ** ..    2.31E-03 ** ..    1.50E-03
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 8.76E-03 ** 8.82E-03 ** 7.12E-03 ** 7.17E-03 ** -3.92E-04 -2.74E-04 -2.80E-04 -6.11E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -6.78E-04 * -6.92E-04 * -4.71E-04 * -4.95E-04 * -3.08E-04 -3.27E-04 -1.57E-04 -1.50E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.38E-05 -3.15E-05 -1.57E-05 -1.34E-05 -2.69E-05 -2.44E-05 -3.38E-05 -3.21E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.078 ** 0.079 ** 0.066 ** 0.068 ** 0.036 * 0.038 * 0.050 ** 0.051 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.961 * 0.960 * 1.438 ** 1.444 ** 0.592 0.604 1.102 * 1.109 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)         (0.61)         (0.61)         (0.60)         (0.60)         (0.60)         (0.63)         (0.63)        
Observations 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 10
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.271 ** -0.235 ** -0.260 ** -0.221 ** -0.228 ** -0.197 ** -0.211 ** -0.183 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.016 0.037 0.025 0.041 0.023
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.015 ** -0.013 ** -0.014 ** -0.014 ** -0.015 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.007 ** 0.005 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.07E-05 2.37E-03 -1.70E-03 2.68E-03 5.01E-04 3.39E-03 * 6.71E-04 3.15E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -8.43E-05 5.05E-05 -2.91E-04 5.41E-05 5.61E-06 1.58E-04 -1.02E-04 8.87E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.73E-05 ** -2.91E-05 * -2.25E-05 -1.96E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.046 ** 0.033 ** 0.045 ** 0.034 ** 0.050 ** 0.044 ** 0.047 ** 0.034 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.051 ** 0.840 ** 1.039 * 0.507 0.779 0.434 0.451 0.629 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.54)         (0.37)         (0.58)         (0.39)         (0.60)         (0.41)        
Observations 1081 1476 1081 1476 1081 1476 1081 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 11
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 4.163 ** -4.540 ** -3.769 ** -4.207 ** -3.230 ** -3.499 ** -2.787 ** -3.046 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)         (0.22)         (0.25)         (0.22)         (0.25)         (0.22)         (0.25)         (0.22)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.009 0.014 0.061 0.012 0.094 0.062 0.093 0.059
   (one lag) (0.06)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.06)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.010 ** -0.011 * -0.011 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 * 0.002 * 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.007 ** 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.004 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 9.01E-03 ** 6.10E-03 ** 8.20E-03 ** 5.08E-03 ** 1.38E-03 1.13E-03 1.65E-03 4.14E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.19E-04 * -6.18E-04 * -6.11E-04 ** -5.24E-04 ** -4.78E-04 * -4.00E-04 * -3.23E-04 -2.36E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.43E-05 -1.73E-05 -2.94E-05 -3.62E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.078 ** 0.043 ** 0.066 ** 0.033 ** 0.032 * 0.015 0.046 ** 0.018
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.952 * 0.379 1.410 ** 0.980 ** 0.528 0.181 1.088 * 0.515
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)         (0.44)         (0.61)         (0.44)         (0.61)         (0.44)         (0.64)         (0.45)        
Observations 1077 1472 1077 1472 1077 1472 1077 1472
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 It takes 1 if undervaluation is greater than 5%, 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.
2/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
3/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 12
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of Real Vulnerabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with Johansen /1 -0.266 ** -0.247 ** -0.255 ** -0.237 ** -0.227 ** -0.210 ** -0.212 ** -0.195 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)           (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.040 0.037 0.045 0.031 0.044 0.041 0.047 0.054
   (one lag) (0.05)           (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.07)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.012 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.004 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.007 ** 0.006 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 7.85E-05 3.74E-04 -1.15E-03 -1.90E-03 5.15E-04 9.54E-04 3.20E-04 1.24E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 0.147 ..    0.634 ..    -0.068 ..    -0.587 ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (2.06)           (2.17)         (2.38)         (2.61)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..    0.065 ..    0.021 ..    0.313 ..    0.391
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (0.43)         (0.44)         (0.47)         (0.52)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.93E-05 -8.22E-05 -2.66E-04 -3.14E-04 4.72E-06 5.11E-05 -9.93E-05 1.26E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.78E-05 ** -3.72E-05 ** -2.94E-05 * -2.85E-05 * -2.33E-05 -2.17E-05 -1.99E-05 -1.79E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  4/ 0.044 ** 0.043 ** 0.045 ** 0.044 ** 0.045 ** 0.051 ** 0.042 ** 0.047 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)           (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention  5/ 1.065 ** 1.258 ** 1.036 * 1.149 * 0.788 0.620 0.443 0.098
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)           (0.58)         (0.54)         (0.59)         (0.58)         (0.63)         (0.60)         (0.66)        
Observations 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values of this variable indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007) 
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Table 13
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
The Role of Real Vulnerabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG /1 -4.082 ** -5.978 ** -3.674 ** -5.364 ** -3.120 ** -5.215 ** -2.719 ** -5.025 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.26)           (0.38)         (0.25)         (0.37)         (0.25)         (0.43)         (0.26)         (0.47)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.010 0.044 0.067 0.082 0.100 * 0.074 0.087 0.072
   (one lag) (0.06)           (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.07)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 * -0.006 -0.012 * -0.005
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 * 0.003 * 0.006 ** 0.005 ** 0.007 ** 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.003
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.02E-02 ** 6.11E-03 ** 9.60E-03 ** 6.20E-03 ** 3.33E-03 -2.86E-03 3.17E-03 -1.91E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 3.150 ..    4.626 ** ..    4.705 * ..    5.655 ** ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (2.33)           (2.36)         (2.42)         (2.53)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..    0.395 ..    0.622 ..    0.862 * ..    0.558
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (0.44)         (0.46)         (0.49)         (0.52)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -7.10E-04 * -5.52E-04 * -6.03E-04 ** -4.69E-04 * -4.75E-04 * -2.70E-04 -3.13E-04 7.52E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.47E-05 -4.08E-06 -1.82E-05 -8.90E-06 -3.00E-05 -1.15E-05 -3.67E-05 -2.42E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  4/ 0.077 ** 0.072 ** 0.070 ** 0.066 ** 0.037 * 0.026 0.045 * 0.053 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)           (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)        
FOREX Market Intervention  5/ 0.821 0.080 1.408 ** 0.613 0.554 -0.371 1.100 * 0.129
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.62)           (0.71)         (0.62)         (0.68)         (0.61)         (0.70)         (0.64)         (0.75)        
Observations 1045 951 1045 951 1045 951 1045 951
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values of this variable indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007)   




Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Sensitivity to changes in the measure of liability dollarization
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.273 ** -0.242 ** -0.230 ** -0.219 ** -0.276 ** -0.245 ** -0.260 ** -0.229 ** -0.244 ** -0.235 ** -0.265 ** -0.232 ** -0.231 ** -0.204 ** -0.201 ** -0.209 ** -0.236 ** -0.207 ** -0.216 ** -0.190 ** -0.181 ** -0.185 ** -0.219 ** -0.193 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.08)         (0.07)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.09)         (0.08)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.09)         (0.09)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.08)         (0.08)         (0.04)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.093 ** 0.083 ** 0.178 ** 0.214 ** 0.094 ** 0.083 ** 0.100 ** 0.076 * 0.211 ** 0.234 ** 0.099 ** 0.077 * 0.103 * 0.084 * 0.229 ** 0.246 ** 0.104 ** 0.086 * 0.116 ** 0.088 * 0.235 ** 0.227 ** 0.117 ** 0.088 *
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.08)         (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.09)         (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.10)         (0.09)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.05)         (0.10)         (0.09)         (0.06)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.93E-03 7.25E-04 2.80E-03 0.001 3.04E-03 ** 1.81E-03 ** 1.99E-03 7.77E-04 2.74E-03 5.93E-04 3.31E-03 ** 1.96E-03 ** 2.08E-03 3.45E-04 2.65E-03 7.78E-04 3.72E-03 ** 1.97E-03 ** 3.20E-03 ** 1.31E-03 3.45E-03 2.55E-03 4.53E-03 ** 2.75E-03 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.97E-03 6.90E-04 2.91E-05 0.000 -2.02E-03 6.94E-04 -3.17E-03 7.71E-04 8.97E-05 -6.77E-05 -3.09E-03 8.16E-04 -1.68E-03 1.69E-03 1.46E-03 1.54E-03 -1.80E-03 1.77E-03 -1.93E-03 1.02E-03 5.24E-04 -3.70E-05 -1.91E-03 1.12E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 1.78E-04 2.87E-04 * ..   ..   ..   ..   2.08E-04 3.10E-04 * ..   ..   ..   ..   2.46E-04 3.86E-04 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   1.71E-04 3.28E-04 * ..   ..   ..   ..  
   as % of GDP 0.00          (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Deposit dollarization ..   ..   -7.31E-02 1.220 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   -1.74E-01 1.08E+00 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   4.42E-01 1.30E+00 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   6.39E-01 9.24E-01 * ..   ..  
   as % of GDP (0.73)         (0.48)         (0.78)         (0.52)         (0.75)         (0.56)         (0.77)         (0.61)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.86E-05 ** ..    -3.94E-05 * ..    -3.77E-05 ** ..    -3.10E-05 * ..    -3.92E-05 * ..    -3.15E-05 * ..    -2.34E-05 ..    -2.27E-05 ..    -2.42E-05 ..    -1.98E-05 ..    -9.74E-06 ..    -2.04E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.047 ** 0.035 0.063 ** 0.062 ** 0.045 ** 0.032 ** 0.042 ** 0.037 ** 0.064 ** 0.060 ** 0.040 ** 0.033 ** 0.051 ** 0.047 ** 0.069 ** 0.070 ** 0.048 ** 0.041 ** 0.049 ** 0.037 ** 0.071 ** 0.067 ** 0.048 ** 0.034 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.37)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.079 ** 0.785 ** 0.898 0.148 1.102 ** 0.775 ** 1.161 ** 0.511 0.603 -0.516 1.108 ** 0.469 0.841 0.446 0.560 -0.402 0.751 0.371 0.537 0.626 * 0.330 -0.178 0.421 0.541
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.37)         (0.85)         (0.63)         (0.51)         (0.37)         (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.87)         (0.63)         (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.57)         (0.39)         (0.88)         (0.65)         (0.56)         (0.39)         (0.58)         (0.41)         (0.89)         (0.70)         (0.58)         (0.41)        
Observations 1081 1480 464 510 1104 1515 1081 1480 464 510 1104 1515 1081 1480 464 510 1104 1515 1081 1480 464 510 1104 1515
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 15
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Can Intervention drive a more persistent likelihood of undervaluation?
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.292 ** -0.274 ** -0.277 ** -0.257 ** -0.244 ** -0.226 ** -0.227 ** -0.209 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.096 ** 0.084 ** 0.103 ** 0.078 * 0.109 ** 0.089 ** 0.123 ** 0.093 *
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.77E-03 5.74E-04 1.82E-03 6.21E-04 1.84E-03 1.53E-04 2.93E-03 * 1.12E-03
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.99E-03 5.06E-04 -3.14E-03 6.23E-04 -1.62E-03 1.54E-03 -1.66E-03 9.60E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 2.71E-04 3.65E-04 ** 3.22E-04 * 4.08E-04 ** 3.98E-04 * 5.22E-04 ** 3.51E-04 * 4.88E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.91E-05 ** ..    -3.15E-05 * ..    -2.39E-05 ..    -2.05E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.047 ** 0.035 ** 0.042 ** 0.036 ** 0.051 ** 0.046 ** 0.048 ** 0.036 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.037 ** 0.763 ** 1.117 ** 0.377 0.802 0.417 0.512 0.597
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.37)         (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.56)         (0.39)         (0.58)         (0.41)        
Intervention x RER misalignment 0.363 ** 0.410 ** 0.332 ** 0.377 ** 0.276 ** 0.313 ** 0.243 * 0.283 **
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.12)         (0.10)         (0.12)         (0.10)         (0.13)         (0.11)         (0.13)         (0.11)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 16
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Do exchange rate regimes help drive a more persistent likelihood of undervaluation?
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  0.107 0.019 0.113 0.017 0.126 * 0.021 0.117 * 0.014
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.08)         (0.05)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.092 ** 0.079 ** 0.099 ** 0.073 * 0.103 * 0.084 * 0.120 ** 0.089 *
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.68E-03 3.24E-04 1.74E-03 3.53E-04 1.79E-03 -1.04E-04 2.86E-03 * 8.71E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.44E-03 -2.51E-05 -3.53E-03 1.14E-04 -2.09E-03 1.08E-03 -2.06E-03 5.12E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 3.37E-04 * 4.23E-04 ** 3.88E-04 ** 4.66E-04 ** 4.55E-04 ** 5.76E-04 ** 4.12E-04 * 5.42E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.94E-05 ** ..    -3.16E-05 * ..    -2.28E-05 ..    -1.90E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.053 ** 0.040 ** 0.049 ** 0.041 ** 0.056 ** 0.050 ** 0.053 ** 0.039 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.021 * 0.744 ** 1.117 ** 0.477 0.780 0.425 0.494 0.613
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.54)         (0.37)         (0.58)         (0.39)         (0.60)         (0.41)        
RER misalignment x Exchange rate regime -0.060 ** -0.045 ** -0.058 ** -0.043 ** -0.056 ** -0.040 ** -0.052 ** -0.036 **
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Observations 1077 1477 1077 1477 1077 1477 1077 1477
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 17
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Do exchange rate regimes help drive a more persistent likelihood of undervaluation? Is there an asymmetric impact?
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  0.127 ** 0.155 ** 0.116 * 0.147 ** 0.107 * 0.138 ** 0.094 * 0.126 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.061 0.069 * 0.054 0.058 0.045 0.057 0.050 0.053
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 2.22E-03 * 7.94E-04 2.22E-03 * 7.50E-04 2.12E-03 * 2.43E-04 2.66E-03 * 9.55E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.77E-03 1.09E-04 -3.79E-03 * 1.77E-04 -2.36E-03 1.18E-03 -1.68E-03 7.42E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 2.60E-04 3.70E-04 ** 3.04E-04 * 4.02E-04 ** 3.42E-04 * 4.76E-04 ** 3.24E-04 * 4.46E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -4.11E-05 ** ..    -3.48E-05 ** ..    -2.19E-05 ..    -1.70E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.008 0.011 -0.002 0.009 0.002 0.014 -0.005 -0.001
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.666 0.569 0.762 0.281 0.496 0.254 0.317 0.515
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.57)         (0.39)         (0.58)         (0.40)         (0.63)         (0.42)         (0.64)         (0.44)        
RER Overvaluation x Exchange rate regime -0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.019 * -0.019 ** -0.014 -0.015 ** -0.011 -0.012 **
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
RER Undervaluation x Exchange rate regime -0.358 ** -0.289 ** -0.355 ** -0.285 ** -0.323 ** -0.265 ** -0.300 ** -0.252 **
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 18
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Can Intervention drive a more persistent likelihood of undervaluation? Is that impact asymmetric?
Dependent Variable: RER Undervaluation (Binary Variable equal to 1 if undervaluation exceeds a certain threshold, k%)
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.394 ** -0.321 ** -0.361 ** -0.296 ** -0.308 ** -0.254 ** -0.284 ** -0.234 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.03)         (0.05)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.108 ** 0.094 ** 0.115 ** 0.087 ** 0.119 ** 0.097 ** 0.134 ** 0.102 **
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.06)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.87E-03 6.01E-04 1.91E-03 6.42E-04 1.91E-03 1.73E-04 2.96E-03 * 1.12E-03
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.22E-03 3.07E-04 -3.33E-03 4.41E-04 -1.80E-03 1.40E-03 -1.81E-03 8.47E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 2.50E-04 3.56E-04 ** 3.05E-04 4.01E-04 ** 3.85E-04 * 5.15E-04 ** 3.41E-04 * 4.84E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.93E-05 ** ..    -3.15E-05 * ..    -2.36E-05 ..    -2.00E-05 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.048 ** 0.035 ** 0.044 ** 0.036 ** 0.053 ** 0.047 ** 0.050 ** 0.037 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 1.018 * 0.790 ** 1.104 ** 0.499 0.779 0.421 0.473 0.596
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.37)         (0.54)         (0.37)         (0.57)         (0.39)         (0.59)         (0.41)        
Intervention x RER Overvaluation 0.474 ** 0.477 ** 0.407 * 0.429 ** 0.312 0.344 ** 0.262 0.307 **
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.22)         (0.12)         (0.25)         (0.12)         (0.28)         (0.12)         (0.30)         (0.12)        
Intervention x RER Undervaluation 4.276 ** 3.037 ** 3.708 ** 2.624 ** 3.000 ** 2.041 ** 2.774 ** 1.877 **
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.96)         (0.78)         (0.93)         (0.76)         (0.89)         (0.74)         (0.87)         (0.73)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
 
Table 19
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
Baseline Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
RER Equilibrium Estimation: Time Series Cointegration (Johansen, 1988, 1991)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.229 ** -0.373 ** -0.230 ** -0.373 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /2 0.051 0.056 0.048 0.057
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.04)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.67E-03 5.16E-04 ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    5.39E-04 1.54E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.26E-03 7.33E-04 -1.05E-03 7.61E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 5.29E-05 1.56E-04 1.06E-04 1.75E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -2.69E-05 ** ..    -2.62E-05 * ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /3 0.021 0.017 0.025 * 0.018
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.188 0.777 ** 0.198 0.783 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.51)         (0.40)         (0.52)         (0.40)        
Observations 1081 1480 1081 1480
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 20
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
Baseline Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
RER Equilibrium Estimation: Pooled Mean Group Estimator (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment with PMG  -0.642 ** -0.786 ** -0.636 ** -0.783 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.008 0.010 * 0.012 0.011 *
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 8.54E-04 ** 3.89E-04 ** ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    ..    5.04E-04 ** 2.47E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO) *
Trade openness 8.32E-04 ** 5.21E-04 * 8.34E-04 ** 5.19E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.10E-04 ** -8.04E-05 * -1.17E-04 ** -8.68E-05 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.09E-06 ** ..    -5.07E-06 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.013 ** 0.007 ** 0.013 ** 0.007 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.167 ** 0.086 0.166 ** 0.086
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.06)        
Observations 1077 1477 1077 1477
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 21
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.233 ** -0.231 ** -0.372 ** -0.372 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.004 -0.006 0.026 0.016
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.006 ** -0.005 * -0.008 * -0.007 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.003 ** 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.24E-04 3.66E-04 0.002 0.002
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.21E-04 -1.65E-04 2.66E-05 5.85E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -2.56E-05 * -2.39E-05 * ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.025 * ..    0.015 ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)        
Coarse classification /3 ..    0.121 ** ..    0.080 *
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)         (0.04)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.110 0.138 0.800 ** 0.811 **
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.52)         (0.40)         (0.40)        
Observations 1081 1081 1476 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
3/ The coarse classification codes from 1 to 6. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
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Table 22
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.644 ** -0.634 ** -0.770 ** -0.767 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.03E-03 ** 1.08E-03 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 **
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.31E-04 ** -1.31E-04 ** -1.04E-04 ** -1.08E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.09E-06 ** -5.07E-06 ** ..    ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.013 ** ..    0.007 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)        
Coarse classification /3 ..    0.039 ** ..    0.022 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.01)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.162 ** 0.175 ** 0.094 * 0.098 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.06)        
Observations 1077 1077 1472 1472
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
3/ The coarse classification codes from 1 to 6. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
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Table 23
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.230 ** -0.226 ** -0.231 ** -0.228 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.003
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.006 -0.008 * -0.005 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.002
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 5.50E-04 -7.24E-04 -1.25E-03 -4.22E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration /2 1.767 ..    1.213 ..   
as Herfindahl Index ratio (2.07)         (2.52)        
Export Concentration /3 ..    1.042 ** ..    0.983
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.42)         (0.76)        
Output Concentration ..    ..    0.010 ..   
as openness times output concentration (0.04)        
Export Concentration ..    ..    ..    -2.80E-04
as openness times export concentration (0.01)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -4.82E-05 -8.89E-05 -1.31E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.69E-05 ** -2.74E-05 * -2.74E-05 ** -2.34E-05 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /4 0.048 ** 0.020 0.020 0.022
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.993 * 0.125 0.132 0.129
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)         (0.60)         (0.53)         (0.61)        
Observations 1049 955 1046 952
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ It is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
3/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 24
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Real Vulnerabilities
Dependent Variable:  Degree of RER Undervaluation if greater than 5% and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.630 ** -0.774 ** -0.630 ** -0.778 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.30E-03 ** 2.04E-04 -1.34E-04 6.94E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration /2 1.072 ** ..    0.647
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.36)         (0.44)        
Export Concentration /3 ..    0.092 * ..    0.177 *
as Herfindahl Index ratio (0.06)         (0.10)        
Output Concentration ..    ..    0.009 *
as openness times output concentration (0.01)        
Export Concentration ..    ..    ..    -1.30E-03
as openness times export concentration (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.31E-04 ** -8.50E-05 ** -1.31E-04 ** -8.09E-05 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.17E-06 ** -3.54E-06 ** -5.10E-06 ** -3.49E-06 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /4 0.013 ** 0.011 ** 0.013 ** 0.011 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.157 ** 0.016 0.146 * 0.018
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.08)         (0.07)         (0.08)         (0.07)        
Observations 1045 951 1042 948
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ It is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. 
The output concentration ratio gives more weight to larger firm.
3/ Herfindahl Index of Merchandise Export Revenue Concentration
4/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
 
Table 25
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
Sensitivity to Changes in Threshold of the Undervaluation Episode
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.229 ** -0.230 ** -0.235 ** -0.236 ** -0.247 ** -0.247 ** -0.249 ** -0.250 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.051 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.060 0.056 0.056 0.065
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.07)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.67E-03 ..    1.71E-03 ..    1.78E-03 ..    2.96E-03 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    5.39E-04 ..    3.91E-04 ..    4.15E-04 ..    9.68E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.26E-03 -1.05E-03 -2.20E-03 -1.70E-03 -1.37E-03 -1.02E-03 -1.58E-03 -9.48E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 5.29E-05 1.06E-04 8.46E-05 1.64E-04 1.44E-04 2.24E-04 6.78E-05 1.60E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -2.69E-05 ** -2.62E-05 * -2.63E-05 * -2.53E-05 * -3.04E-05 * -2.89E-05 * -3.10E-05 * -2.99E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.021 0.025 * 0.023 0.027 * 0.039 * 0.042 * 0.040 * 0.043 *
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.188 0.198 0.305 0.340 0.183 0.207 -0.075 -0.035
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.51)         (0.52)         (0.58)         (0.58)         (0.74)         (0.74)         (0.82)         (0.82)        
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 26
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
Sensitivity to Changes in Threshold of the Undervaluation Episode
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.642 ** -0.636 ** -0.690 ** -0.683 ** -0.884 ** -0.876 ** -0.999 ** -0.993 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.10)         (0.10)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.008 0.012 0.019 * 0.023 ** 0.042 ** 0.048 ** 0.052 * 0.058 **
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 8.54E-04 ** ..    1.04E-03 ** ..    1.51E-03 ** ..    1.48E-03 ** ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities ..    5.04E-04 ** ..    6.39E-04 ** ..    8.98E-04 ** ..    8.14E-04 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 8.32E-04 ** 8.34E-04 ** 1.02E-03 ** 1.00E-03 ** 1.26E-05 1.94E-05 -4.37E-05 2.86E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.10E-04 ** -1.17E-04 ** -1.14E-04 ** -1.27E-04 ** -1.25E-04 * -1.40E-04 * -1.01E-04 -1.06E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.09E-06 ** -5.07E-06 ** -4.41E-06 * -4.39E-06 * -4.88E-06 -4.92E-06 -6.41E-06 -6.51E-06
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.014 ** 0.015 ** 0.014 ** 0.014 ** 0.023 ** 0.023 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.167 ** 0.166 ** 0.241 ** 0.240 ** 0.197 0.194 0.368 * 0.369 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.09)         (0.09)         (0.15)         (0.16)         (0.22)         (0.22)        
Observations 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)  
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Table 27
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment -0.233 ** -0.231 ** -0.239 ** -0.237 ** -0.251 ** -0.248 ** -0.249 ** -0.247 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.03)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.014 -0.009 -0.021 -0.006 -0.018
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.07)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.006 ** -0.005 * -0.008 ** -0.008 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.011 * -0.011 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.003 ** 0.002 * 0.003 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.006 ** 0.006 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -2.24E-04 3.66E-04 -1.06E-03 -2.62E-04 4.24E-04 9.57E-04 7.75E-04 1.41E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.21E-04 -1.65E-04 -2.50E-04 -1.90E-04 -2.67E-04 -2.00E-04 -1.25E-04 -1.28E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -2.56E-05 * -2.39E-05 * -2.47E-05 * -2.34E-05 * -2.65E-05 -2.51E-05 -3.00E-05 -2.75E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.025 * ..    0.027 ..    0.045 ** ..    0.040 * ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)        
Coarse classification /3 ..    0.121 ** ..    0.116 ** ..    0.179 ** ..    0.187 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.08)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.110 0.138 0.216 0.237 0.034 0.083 -0.184 -0.156
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.52)         (0.52)         (0.58)         (0.58)         (0.74)         (0.74)         (0.83)         (0.82)        
Observations 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
3/ The coarse classification codes from 1 to 6. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
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Table 28
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of the Structure of External Assets and Liabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.644 ** -0.634 ** -0.696 ** -0.684 ** -0.894 ** -0.876 ** -1.010 ** -0.975 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.10)         (0.10)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.003 0.002 0.012 0.010 0.028 0.023 0.034 0.026
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
Equity-related Liabilities 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.005 * -0.005 *
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.002 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.03E-03 ** 1.08E-03 ** 1.32E-03 ** 1.38E-03 ** 5.75E-04 7.79E-04 7.59E-04 1.11E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.31E-04 ** -1.31E-04 ** -1.44E-04 ** -1.41E-04 ** -1.77E-04 ** -1.77E-04 ** -1.72E-04 * -1.65E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.09E-06 ** -5.07E-06 ** -4.44E-06 * -4.38E-06 * -5.01E-06 -5.01E-06 -6.47E-06 -5.40E-06
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Fine classification /2 0.013 ** ..    0.014 ** ..    0.012 ** ..    0.020 ** ..   
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Coarse classification /3 ..    0.039 ** ..    0.043 ** ..    0.012 ** ..    0.089 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.03)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.162 ** 0.175 ** 0.235 ** 0.249 ** 0.184 0.184 0.358 * 0.398 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.09)         (0.09)         (0.15)         (0.15)         (0.22)         (0.22)        
Observations 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
3/ The coarse classification codes from 1 to 6. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
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Table 29
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of Real Vulnerabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.230 ** -0.226 ** -0.235 ** -0.231 ** -0.249 ** -0.245 ** -0.252 ** -0.247 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)           (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.04)         (0.04)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.004 -0.003 0.012 -0.011 0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
   (one lag) (0.05)           (0.05)         (0.06)         (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.07)         (0.08)         (0.08)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.008 ** -0.006 -0.010 ** -0.008 * -0.011 * -0.008 -0.012 * -0.009
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.004 ** 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.003 0.006 ** 0.004
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 5.50E-04 -7.24E-04 1.48E-04 -1.51E-03 -1.67E-04 2.23E-04 4.20E-04 8.00E-04
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 1.767 ..    1.672 ..    0.533 ..    -0.092 ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (2.07)           (2.25)         (3.06)         (2.98)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..    1.042 ** ..    1.062 ** ..    1.371 ** ..    1.530 **
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (0.42)         (0.46)         (0.54)         (0.60)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -2.75E-04 -4.82E-05 -7.91E-05 -7.12E-05 -8.32E-05 3.88E-05 -1.20E-04 8.03E-07
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -3.69E-05 ** -2.74E-05 * -2.74E-05 * -2.63E-05 * -3.08E-05 * -2.68E-05 -3.01E-05 -2.68E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  /4 0.048 ** 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.040 * 0.035 0.039
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)           (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.03)        
FOREX Market Intervention  /5 0.993 * 0.125 0.229 0.184 0.093 -0.248 -0.189 -0.755
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.53)           (0.60)         (0.59)         (0.68)         (0.75)         (0.85)         (0.83)         (0.95)        
Observations 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955 1049 955
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007) 
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Table 30
Determinants of the Magnitude of RER undervaluation: Tobit Estimation
The Role of Real Vulnerabilities and Different Undervaluation Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with PMG
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.630 ** -0.774 ** -0.675 ** -0.841 ** -0.864 ** -1.160 ** -0.971 ** -1.438 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)           (0.04)         (0.04)         (0.05)         (0.07)         (0.09)         (0.10)         (0.14)        
Capital Controls
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.028 0.021 0.029 0.024
   (one lag) (0.01)           (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)        
Equity-related Liabilities -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 * -0.001 -0.005 ** -0.001
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Loan-related Liabilities 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.001
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness 1.30E-03 ** 2.04E-04 1.67E-03 ** 4.08E-04 1.25E-03 -9.75E-04 1.46E-03 -1.07E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Output Concentration           /2 1.072 ** ..    1.380 ** ..    1.757 ** ..    2.551 ** ..   
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (0.36)           (0.45)         (0.72)         (1.01)        
Export Concentration            /3 ..    0.092 * ..    0.118 * ..    0.233 * ..    0.233
 Hirschman-Herfindahl index  (0.06)         (0.07)         (0.12)         (0.17)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money -1.31E-04 ** -8.50E-05 ** -1.42E-04 ** -9.67E-05 ** -1.76E-04 ** -9.31E-05 -1.70E-04 * -1.20E-05
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -5.17E-06 ** -3.54E-06 ** -4.46E-06 * -2.80E-06 -5.02E-06 -2.72E-06 -6.64E-06 -3.10E-06
   as % of GDP (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Flexibility  /4 0.013 ** 0.011 ** 0.015 ** 0.012 ** 0.013 ** 0.009 * 0.020 ** 0.018 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)           (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention  /5 0.157 ** 0.016 0.236 ** 0.060 0.192 -0.075 0.362 * -0.021
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.08)           (0.07)         (0.09)         (0.09)         (0.16)         (0.15)         (0.22)         (0.22)        
Observations 1049 955 1045 951 1045 951 1045 951
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of output concentation based on the 1-digit ISIC classification of economic activity.
3/ We compute the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of export concentation based on the 2-digit SITC classification of export revenues.
4/ Our proxy of exchange rate flexbility follows the "fine" classification coded from 1 to 15 by Reinhart and Rogoff. Higher values indicate a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
5/ Annual average change in the ratio of reserves to broad money. Positive values of this variable imply a "strong" degree of intervention, because for intervention to be positive reserve accumulation must exceed the incresae
 in monetary aggregates (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007)   
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Table 31
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Tobit Estimation 
Sensitivity to changes in the measure of liability dollarization
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.229 ** -0.373 ** -0.223 ** -0.778 ** -0.231 ** -0.798 ** -0.235 ** -0.381 ** -0.225 ** -0.923 ** -0.236 ** -0.861 ** -0.247 ** -0.398 ** -0.227 ** -1.095 ** -0.249 ** -0.999 ** -0.249 ** -0.403 ** -0.227 ** -1.134 ** -0.251 ** -1.080 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.11)         (0.03)         (0.06)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.14)         (0.03)         (0.07)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.19)         (0.03)         (0.09)         (0.04)         (0.03)         (0.03)         (0.22)         (0.04)         (0.11)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.051 0.056 0.072 0.093 ** 0.042 0.021 0.048 0.051 0.093 0.002 0.051 0.012 0.060 0.052 0.106 0.102 0.051 -0.013 0.056 0.048 0.117 0.119 0.057 -0.013
   (one lag) (0.05)         (0.04)         (0.08)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.03)         (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.09)         (0.06)         (0.05)         (0.03)         (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.11)         (0.09)         (0.06)         (0.04)         (0.07)         (0.06)         (0.11)         (0.11)         (0.07)         (0.05)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 1.67E-03 5.16E-04 3.34E-03 0.000 2.28E-03 ** 4.38E-04 1.71E-03 4.54E-04 3.05E-03 -0.001 2.52E-03 ** 4.84E-04 1.78E-03 -1.51E-04 3.31E-03 -0.001 3.13E-03 ** 6.61E-04 2.96E-03 6.85E-04 3.83E-03 0.000 3.80E-03 ** 8.34E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -1.26E-03 7.33E-04 -2.45E-03 0.002 * -1.36E-03 4.33E-04 -2.20E-03 4.59E-04 -2.47E-03 0.002 -2.12E-03 4.01E-05 -1.37E-03 8.93E-04 -1.69E-03 0.003 -1.70E-03 4.51E-04 -1.58E-03 1.62E-04 -1.32E-03 0.003 -1.70E-03 1.03E-03
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 5.29E-05 1.56E-04 ..   ..   ..   ..   8.46E-05 1.83E-04 ..   ..   ..   ..   1.44E-04 2.94E-04 ..   ..   ..   ..   6.78E-05 2.52E-04 ..   ..   ..   ..  
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Deposit dollarization ..   ..   -5.16E-01 0.779 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   -3.97E-01 0.972 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   -5.83E-02 0.926 ** ..   ..   ..   ..   2.10E-01 0.980 * ..   ..  
   as % of GDP (0.61)         (0.27)         (0.63)         (0.33)         (0.90)         (0.44)         (0.86)         (0.53)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -2.69E-05 ** ..    -2.62E-05 ..    -2.64E-05 ** ..    -2.63E-05 * ..    -2.65E-05 ..    -2.75E-05 * ..    -3.04E-05 * ..    -1.23E-05 ..    -3.10E-05 * ..    -3.10E-05 * ..    -5.64E-06 ..    -3.23E-05 * ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.021 0.017 0.046 * 0.015 0.022 0.010 * 0.023 0.021 0.051 * 0.014 0.021 0.012 * 0.039 * 0.042 ** 0.068 * 0.001 0.037 * 0.017 * 0.040 * 0.035 * 0.080 * -0.005 0.041 * 0.013
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.03)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.04)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.01)         (0.03)         (0.02)         (0.04)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.01)        
FOREX Market Intervention 0.188 0.777 ** 0.009 0.308 0.192 0.461 * 0.305 0.689 * -0.191 0.186 0.258 0.564 * 0.183 0.775 -0.098 0.211 0.084 0.590 -0.075 1.068 * -0.302 0.368 -0.192 0.549
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.51)         (0.40)         (0.81)         (0.49)         (0.51)         (0.25)         (0.58)         (0.45)         (0.89)         (0.61)         (0.57)         (0.29)         (0.74)         (0.57)         (1.07)         (0.86)         (0.72)         (0.41)         (0.82)         (0.64)         (1.19)         (0.96)         (0.81)         (0.48)        
Observations 1081 1480 464 151 1104 469 1081 1480 464 151 1104 469 1081 1480 464 151 1104 469 1081 1480 464 151 1104 469
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
  68 
Table 32
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Tobit Estimation 
Intervention in the FOREX market and the persistence of undervaluations
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment  -0.033 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.033 ** -0.029 ** -0.031 ** -0.028 ** -0.029 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.037 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 ** 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.023 ** 0.026 ** 0.020 *
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 5.59E-04 2.69E-04 5.32E-04 2.55E-04 4.84E-04 7.22E-05 6.67E-04 * 2.83E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.41E-04 2.94E-04 -8.04E-04 2.46E-04 -3.61E-04 4.67E-04 -4.47E-04 7.64E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 8.96E-05 * 1.12E-04 ** 1.01E-04 ** 1.20E-04 ** 1.16E-04 ** 1.49E-04 ** 1.02E-04 ** 1.35E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -9.70E-06 ** ..    -7.37E-06 * ..    -4.63E-06 ..    -3.64E-06 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.018 ** 0.013 ** 0.016 ** 0.012 ** 0.016 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.009 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Intervention in FOREX markets 0.308 ** 0.219 * 0.313 ** 0.128 0.171 0.092 0.088 0.128
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.16)         (0.12)         (0.15)         (0.11)         (0.14)         (0.10)         (0.13)         (0.10)        
Intervention x RER misalignment 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.008
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 33
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Tobit Estimation 
Exchange rate regimes and the persistence of undervaluations
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment   -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.033 ** -0.036 ** -0.029 ** -0.032 ** -0.027 ** -0.032 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.037 ** 0.033 ** 0.034 ** 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.024 ** 0.027 ** 0.021 **
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         0.01          (0.01)         (0.01)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 5.61E-04 2.77E-04 5.29E-04 2.56E-04 4.79E-04 6.17E-05 6.61E-04 * 2.75E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         -3.90E-04 -3.16E-04 -3.63E-04 -2.90E-04 -3.48E-04 -2.86E-04
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.36E-04 3.30E-04 -8.10E-04 2.32E-04 -3.65E-04 4.53E-04 -4.51E-04 6.33E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 9.00E-05 * 1.12E-04 ** 1.01E-04 ** 1.20E-04 ** 1.18E-04 ** 1.50E-04 ** 1.05E-04 ** 1.36E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         -4.81E-05 (0.00)         -4.67E-05 (0.00)         -4.31E-05 (0.00)         -4.21E-05
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -9.67E-06 ** ..    -7.34E-06 * ..    -4.57E-06 ..    -3.56E-06 ..   
   as % of GDP -4.46E-06 -4.32E-06 -4.05E-06 -3.77E-06
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.019 ** 0.013 ** 0.016 ** 0.012 ** 0.016 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.009 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Intervention in FOREX markets 0.308 ** 0.220 * 0.313 ** 0.128 0.169 0.092 0.086 0.127
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.16)         (0.12)         (0.15)         (0.11)         (0.14)         (0.10)         (0.13)         (0.10)        
RER misalignment x Exchange rate regime 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Observations 1077 1477 1077 1477 1077 1477 1077 1477
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
  70 
Table 34
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Tobit Estimation 
Exchange rate regimes and the persistence of undervaluations: Asymmetric effects
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment   0.010 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.020 * 0.007 0.021 * 0.007
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.030 ** 0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.022 * 0.020 * 0.017 * 0.018 * 0.014
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 6.10E-04 * 3.02E-04 5.59E-04 * 2.66E-04 4.85E-04 6.25E-05 6.10E-04 * 2.43E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.60E-04 2.77E-04 -8.10E-04 2.12E-04 -4.01E-04 3.77E-04 -4.58E-04 3.59E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 9.16E-05 * 1.05E-04 ** 1.05E-04 ** 1.14E-04 ** 1.21E-04 ** 1.42E-04 ** 1.12E-04 ** 1.30E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -8.08E-06 * ..    -5.88E-06 ..    -3.29E-06 ..    -2.42E-06 ..   
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.014 ** 0.009 ** 0.012 ** 0.008 ** 0.011 ** 0.009 ** 0.009 ** 0.005 *
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Intervention in FOREX markets 0.353 ** 0.233 ** 0.362 ** 0.143 0.224 * 0.109 0.142 0.146 *
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.15)         (0.11)         (0.15)         0.11          (0.13)         (0.10)         (0.12)         (0.09)        
RER Overvaluation x Exchange rate regime -0.002 * -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.001
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
RER Undervaluation x Exchange rate regime -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.027 ** -0.030 ** -0.028 ** -0.030 ** -0.027 **
  (Interaction term, lagged) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)    
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Table 35
Determinants of the Likelihood of RER Undervaluation: Probit Estimation 
Intervention in FOREX market and the persistence of undervaluations: Asymmetric effects
Dependent Variable: Degree of RER Undervaluation if it exceeds a certain threshold k%, and 0 otherwise
Sample of 79 countries, 1971-2005 (Annual)
RER Misalignments with Johansen
Undervaluation > 5% Undervaluation > 10% Undervaluation > 20% Undervaluation > 25%
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dummy Variable
RER misalignment   -0.032 ** -0.035 ** -0.031 ** -0.034 ** -0.029 ** -0.031 ** -0.027 ** -0.029 **
   as a ratio (one lag) (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.01)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Financial Openness (FO)
Chinn-Ito measure of capital controls /1 0.038 ** 0.032 ** 0.035 ** 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.023 ** 0.027 ** 0.020 *
   (one lag) (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)         (0.01)        
Total Foreign Liabilities 5.63E-04 2.66E-04 5.33E-04 2.53E-04 4.83E-04 6.08E-05 6.51E-04 * 2.84E-04
   as % of GDP (0.00)         -3.26E-04 -3.90E-04 -3.16E-04 -3.61E-04 -2.91E-04 -3.48E-04 -2.76E-04
Trade Openness (TO)
Trade openness -4.30E-04 2.95E-04 -8.07E-04 2.46E-04 -3.73E-04 4.41E-04 -4.53E-04 7.55E-05
   as % of GDP (one lag) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         -6.66E-04 -5.69E-04 -6.43E-04 -5.41E-04
Liability Dollarization
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money 5.63E-04 1.12E-04 ** 1.01E-04 ** 1.20E-04 ** 1.16E-04 ** 1.50E-04 ** 1.04E-04 ** 1.35E-04 **
   as % of GDP (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         -4.67E-05 (0.00)         -4.31E-05 (0.00)         -4.09E-05
Fiscal Policy
Central Government Balance -9.66E-06 ** ..    -7.28E-06 * ..    -4.56E-06 ..    -3.59E-06 ..   
   as % of GDP -4.46E-06 -4.36E-06 -3.98E-06 -3.77E-06
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange rate regime /2 0.018 ** 0.013 ** 0.016 ** 0.012 ** 0.016 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.009 **
 (Reinhart and Rogoff fine classification) (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        
Intervention in FOREX markets 0.308 ** 0.219 * -0.313 ** 0.128 0.171 0.092 0.089 0.128
 (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger definition) (0.16)         (0.12)         (0.15)         (0.11)         (0.14)         (0.10)         (0.13)         (0.10)        
Intervention x RER Overvaluation 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)         (0.02)        
Intervention x RER Undervaluation 0.079 -0.021 0.072 -0.016 0.078 0.006 0.100 0.021
  (Interaction term, current)  (0.16)         (0.09)         (0.16)         (0.09)         (0.15)         (0.08)         (0.14)         (0.08)        
Observations 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476 1076 1476
Prob > chi2 (Wald chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1/ This capital closeness is calculated by multiplying -1 by kaopen in Chinn-Ito Index.
2/ The fine classification codes from 1 to 15. The higher number describes more floating regimes. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004)   